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Secondary water supplies have been included within the standard due to their 
perceived increase in the reliability of the water supplied to the sprinkler system, 
however, the decision on which secondary water supply best fits a building or 
region has not been adequately researched. By deriving the availability of the 
water supply, the different solutions covered by the New Zealand Standards can 
be compared. 
 
The methodology considers the major influences on the reliability of a water 
supply headworks as well as the infrastructure involved in the secondary water 
supplies. In order to assess the reliability of these systems, critical components 
within the system need to be identified.  
 
Comprehensive data collected for all the critical components of the water supply 
are analysed to obtain a comparison of the reliability of secondary water 
supplies. A Monte Carlo simulation is then used to generate random failures. 
These failure can be used to examine the reliability of the water supply.  
 
The probabilities found during this examination confirm the additional reliability 
found in dual supply. It also shows that there are large variations in the reliability 
of the supply depending on the source of the town‟s mains supply.   
 
Current literature describing the reliability of water supplies is examined and a 
case study of the Adelaide headworks is conducted showing the compatibility of 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
 
This report assesses the reliability of the water supply to sprinkler systems and 
aims to provide recommendations on the effectiveness of various water supplies 
to enhance the operability of the supply.  
 
The supply of water to a sprinkler system requires at least one reliable source 
defined as the primary source. Where a building presents a higher risk or where 
it is difficult for fire service to control fires due to the size of the building an 
additional water supply or secondary supply operating in tandem with the 
primary supply is required under the current New Zealand sprinkler standard 
(NZS 4541:2007) for commercial buildings. These additional water supplies are 
provided to achieve a higher level of safety through increased reliability of the 
water supply feeding the fire sprinkler systems.  
 
The New Zealand standard divides the design of these supplies into a number of 
classes. The aim of this is to provide sufficient capacity and a stable level of 
water pressure from a single supply. However, the New Zealand standard may 
also require the provision of an alternative source of water to increase reliability. 
 
Within these secondary water supply classes, special consideration is given to 
areas prone to earthquakes. A typical post-earthquake scenario involves damage 
to all the major infrastructure of the water supply network. This historical 
occurrence of widespread damage to the water supplies coupled with the 
assumed high rate of fire occurring post-earthquake leads to an assessment of the 
system reliability when exposed to an earthquake to be considered along with the 
water supplies‟ operational reliability. 
 
The reliability of the water supplies is dependent on the source of the supply. 
There are a number of alternative sources that can be used as a secondary supply 
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to achieve a design compliant with the New Zealand sprinkler standard (NZ4541 
2007). Some of the alternatives to achieve this are listed below with more 
discussion on the alternatives in chapter 2 and the full requirements of the 
sprinkler standard in Appendix A.  
 
 Additional town‟s main which can be boosted or pump driven. 
 Elevated, gravity, suction and pressure tanks 
 Alternative sources, which are pump driven such as: 
o Private reservoir 
o Natural source such as rivers, lakes and underground water 
supply.  
This report is concerned with the performance of these secondary water supply 
sources when attached alongside a primary supply and the effect that different 
methods of attaching these water supplies has on reliability of the system. In 
order to achieve this it is necessary to establish the reliability of each of these 
sources including that of the town‟s main. This can then be used to determine the 
reliability of the secondary water supply due to the variation in the class of the 
supply and in the physical components used in the primary and secondary 
supply.  The primary focus of this report will remain on supplies within New 
Zealand supplemented with additional data from Australia, Canada and the 
United States of America. 
 
1.2 Aim and objectives 
 
Secondary water supplies have been included within the standard due to their 
perceived increase in the reliability of the water supplied to the sprinkler system, 
however, the decision on which secondary water supply best fits a building or 
region has not been adequately researched. 
 
The aim of this report is to produce a general model of the reliability of the water 
supply system up to the start of the control valve enclosure. The control valves 
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enclosure houses an assembly of stop and alarm valves, which typically mark the 
point prior to the supply entering the sprinkler system. The calculation of 
reliabilities at this point will include the variations in the different supply classes 
of the New Zealand standard. Including variations in the components enables an 
investigation into whether local effects generate a secondary supply class which 
is more reliable under a number of conditions. 
 
The aim of this model is to produce an answer to the question; if the water 
supply is needed, what is the probability that water will be available to supply 




This section presents a methodology for the assessment of the reliability of the 
secondary water supplies under a single and dual supply source. The 
methodology considers the major elements that affect the reliability within the 
town‟s water supply as well as those from locally sourced water. 
 
In order to perform an assessment of the water supply a number of questions 
need to be asked: 
 
 What are the critical components? 
 Do they relate to a fire engineering solution? 
 If they relate to fire engineering solution, what is their reliability? 
 
In many cases, components of the system are difficult to identify therefore it is 
important that a consistent level of uncertainty be maintained for these 
components throughout the report. In particular the components that make up the 
town‟s supply were difficult to categorise. In order to overcome this data was 
collected from a number of different sources and countries enabling the creation 
of a number of generic water transfer systems. As discussed, in the future work it 
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would be possible to modify the data within the model for a specific supply if the 
components of the system are known. 
 
Once values for the components were obtained, the Monte Carlo technique was 
used to combine the reliability of the individual system components into 
reliability value for the water system before it enters the sprinkler supply. By 
simulating random faults over a number of time steps the Monte Carlo technique 
allows for the combination of both components connected in series and parallel 
to be combined to obtain the overall availability of the water supply. 
 
1.4 Scope 
This report applies to secondary water supply systems installed in New Zealand 
and aims to remain within the context of the question stated in the aims and 
objectives by providing an answer to the question; if the supply is needed, what 
is the chance that it will supply the water required to the system? Under this 
context, the application is to secondary water supplies designed and installed in 
compliance with the recommendation in the New Zealand standard. The ability 
of a dual water supply to provide water will largely be governed by elements of 
the water supply that directly feed into the supply and this will be the focus of 
the report. However, large-scale natural events will also have an effect on the 
reliability of the system. For this reason, the report will include events such as 
droughts and earthquakes. 
 
The design and reliability of the sprinklers systems attached to the dual water 
supplies are related to the occupancies of the building and can be design to 
comply with the standards in a number of ways. However, research into dual 
water supplies can be carried out independently of the sprinkler system installed. 
This allows for their exclusion from the scope of the report and connection 
downstream of the control valve assembly, this includes the sprinkler system and 




Therefore, the report will be limited to all components and factors from the 
source point through the distribution system and dual water supply up to the 
control valve assembly, which as discussed is typically the final point before the 
water enters the building‟s water supply and the suppression systems.  
 
There is scope for further work to be conducted in this areas related to 
cost/benefits and to cover supplies outside the New Zealand Standard. However, 
this is outside the scope of this report.  
 
1.5 Outline 
The section summarises the chapters that appear in the report. The overall aim as 
stated above is construct a report for the reliability model of dual water 
installations. To achieve this, the report starts with an overall look at what are the 
dual water supplies available, the methods of distribution from the reservoir to 
the buildings, and the methods of analysis used to investigate the reliability. 
Before focusing on the data related to the specific assessment of the reliability of 
the water supply in different locations and the reliability of the secondary water 
supplies. 
 
Chapter 2 Background  
The process of water delivery and the infrastructure involved is important to the 
reliability of the end supply. Background in this area will involve the 
examination of the different delivery methods used within New Zealand as well 
as the details of the secondary supplies and the condition under which they are 
applied. 
 
Chapter 3 Literature Review  
This chapter provides a literature review of the topic. Covering discussion on 






Chapter 4 Reliability of Water Supply Infrastructure 
This chapter will present data collected from a number of sources to provide 
reliability figures for elements of the water supply such as pumps, pipe work, 
valves, tanks, filtration, and treatment. Secondary effects such as earthquakes 
and drought will also be examined to see their effect on the water supply.  
 
Chapter 5 Analysis of the Reliability up to the Premises 
Looking at a specific example system and comparing the results to those from 
other studies. In addition, the significance of each of the variables within the 
calculation is examined. 
 
Chapter 6 Analysis and application of the secondary water supplies 
This chapter will analyse the varying reliability that are achieved by applying the 
different available secondary supplies. The analysis provides for a comparison 
between the different types of secondary supply when compared against a single 
supply.  
 
Chapter 7 Future research 
There will be some additional work that can be continued after this report is 
completed. In particular, there will be the opportunity to add cost to the model, to 
assess the costs vs. benefit of the secondary water supplies. 
 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 








Chapter 2. Background 
2.1 Standards 
The New Zealand Standard NZS:4541 for sprinkler systems mandates the 
functional requirements of the system and the associated components required in 
the construction with the stated aim of ensuring that every sprinkler system has a 
reliable primary water supply.  
 
The water supply of sprinkler systems under the standards is divided into three 
classifications aimed at providing supply reliabilities in decreasing order. 
 
Class A. Dual superior supply. Dual supplies provided by a primary and 
secondary supply with only one of the supply sources dependent of the town‟s 
main. 
 
Class B Private Site fire main.  Two supply sources, one of which is independent 
of the town‟s main. Where a Class B supply differs from a Class A is by the 
inclusion of a private site reticulation system.  This consists of a ring of pipe 
surrounding the property that can independently isolate sections of the supply 
network for repair and maintenance. 
 
Class C Single supply. A single boosted water supply connection provided by a 
primary supply usually sourced from the town‟s main. Used when the pressure of 
the water supply requires boosting. The single supply is divided into two sub-
classes C1 and C2. The Class C2 superior supply increases reliability over the 
C1 supply by adding a second fire pump. 
 
The standard requires that buildings presenting a greater risk, those building over 
25m high or with a hazard factor (hazard factor represent the risk of an 
earthquake event and are tabulated based on location in NZS 1170.5) greater 





fitted with a dual water supply. If the hazard factor is below 0.13 a Class C2, 
supply is the minimum requirement under the standard.  
2.2 Water Supply Class 
 
As part of the aim of this report, it was stated that investigation would be 
conducted into the reliability of the different connection option. In order to 
achieve this the connection need to be broken down into their components. From 
section 602.2 and 602.3 of NZS 4541:2007 a number of combinations are 
available that can be used to supply the primary and secondary water supplies. 
These options provide the possible different combinations for connection of a 
primary and secondary supply and are applicable to both Class A and B2 
supplies, while the primary supply is applicable to both types of a Class C 
supply. The options for supply connection are tabulated below. 
 
 
Table 1 Supply options (specified in NZ 4541:2007) 
Primary Secondary 
Town‟s mains Diesel pump supplied by other sources 
Town‟s mains Electric pump supplied by other sources 
Town‟s mains Elevated tank 
Diesel pump supplied by other sources Diesel pump  supplied by other sources 
Diesel pump supplied by other sources Electric pump supplied by other sources 
Diesel pump supplied by other sources Elevated tank 
Elevated tank  Elevated tank 
Elevated tank Electric pump supplied by other sources 
 
Other sources include: well, open water and tanks (on-ground or in-ground). 
 
2.2.1  Class A Dual Superior Supply 
The standard provides a typical layout of the installation of the applicable class 
of supply briefly described above. The figure below from the New Zealand 
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Standards illustrates what is expected in the installations for a typical Class A 
supply. 




In order to model the reliability of such systems it is important to include as 
much detail as possible especially considering the overall similarity of the 
designs. For the illustration of a typical Class A supply, shown in Figure 1, a 
breakdown of all the components along with the possible supply connection 
(both primary and secondary) can be constructed. 
 
Since the component required for a town‟s main connection are different to those 
required for locally sourced supplies two lists are required. 
 
For a town‟s main providing the supply, the following components are required: 
 Main‟s supply 
 TOBY  Valve, council controlled shut-off valve 
 Pipe 
 Check Valve 
The components required when using a locally source water source as the 




 Concrete tank with a roof  
 or  Wooden tank with a roof  
 or Steel tanks with a roof 
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 or  Polyethylene tank meeting AS/NZ 4766 and secured  
 or  Other provided design by chartered engineer  
 or Swimming pools meeting conditions outline in 
standards. 
o  Or Wells and artesian bores 
o Or Open water 




 Pipe network 
 
Class B Private Site Fire main 
As with the Class A supply the standard provides a typical setup for a Class B 
supply. Class B supplies vary from the Class A supply by the inclusion of a loop 
main. This attempts the limit the pressure drop across the connections. However, 
this presents additional reliability issues due to the increase length of pipe and its 
possible exposure to earthquakes. 
 






As stated in the scope, this report is not directly concerned with reliability of the 
sprinkler system, only the water supply feeding it, this also extends to hydrant 
connections fitted of the site main.  
 
The components required in the installation of a Class B supply. 
 
Town‟s Mains 
 Town‟s main supply 
 TOBY valve 
 Connected in parallel are 
o pipe 
On-site Supplies 
 Supply (as in Class A supply) 




 check valve 
 pipe network 
 
Class C 
Class C supplies as mentioned previously are divided into two sub-classes both 
of which require only a primary supply. However, Class C2 supplies require the 
addition of a secondary pump aimed at providing greater reliability. This 
increased reliability is generally to the quality of the water supply maintaining 
pressure during a pump failure. 
 
While the focus of the report is on the additional reliability of the secondary 
supply the Class C supply provides a datum from which to compare the 
additional reliability of the secondary supplies. 
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2.3 Background to the water supply and area of reliability 
 
Fundamental to the assessment of the reliability of a water supply system is an 
understanding of its design and operation. Typically, the operation of water 
supply systems can be broken into two distinct areas: headworks and 
distribution. The headworks covers the collections, treatment and transfer of 
water.  The management of these areas is often separated to allow for the 
distribution of water from a single collection point to multiple demand locations. 
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This separation is one of the reasons that reliability assessments of water 
supplies are limited to one area of research.  
 
2.3.1 Headworks 
Headworks for this report shall comprise all of the following: 
 
a) Supply source, i.e. bores, wells, dams, and weirs  
b) Treatment plant 
c) Pumping system, supply pumps from the supply source and booster 
pumps within the delivery system 
d) Trunk mains, pipes from the point of supply to service infrastructure 
(treatment plants, pumps, storage tanks) 




The principal water source for the majority of water supply is the natural run-off 
from catchment areas. This water enters the river, dams and lakes to create 
inflows. These inflows can exhibit large variations over time with the variability 
affecting the reliability of the water supply system as trade-offs are made to 
insure a constant supply. 
 
These trade-offs can be managed in a variety of ways. However, in recent years 
the main method used has been Network Models. Within these models, a set of 
nodes is constructed and connected via links. Either these nodes can represent 
demand centres such as towns, agriculture, etc, or they can represent reservoirs. 
The links between these nodes has a cost of moving the water between the nodes. 
The model can then be used to determine the amount of water that can be 





The application of these models in the water infrastructure management has 
produced a number of generalised models including WATHNET (Kuczera), 
REALM (Diment), and WASP (Kuczera). These models allow for the 
determination of the reliability of the bulk water being supply. This reliability 
excludes any effect the infrastructure has on the reliability and is most useful in 
fire engineering applications in determining the susceptibility of the reservoir 
network to drought or supply shortages. 
 
Along with the reliability of the water demand, it is important to include the 
infrastructure, which is excluded from these models. This includes the reliability 
of elements in the collection system such as dam walls, weirs, pumps, and pipes 
used for bulk transfers.  
 
2.3.1.2 Treatment and Transfer 
 
Water treatment plants comprise a number of physical components to transfer, 
store and treat water, some of these components represent area of critical 
component failure and will affect the reliability of the system.  
The treatment of the supply occurs in water treatment plants with foremost 
motivation of improving the clarity and to removing harmful organisms or 
pathogens in the supply. This treatment is conducted through a number of 
processing stages.  
 
 Coagulation, flocculation and sedimentation form the first step in the 
process and are design to remove any particles from the water. The 
process involves the addition of chemicals to the supply to bind the 
particles together before sedimentation. 
 
 Filtration involves the passing of the water through a sand or 





 The final treatment for the supply is the addition of a disinfection agent. 
The majority of the time this agent is chlorine and is used to kill the 
organism and pathogens in the supply. 
 
In addition to these steps, chemicals may be added to the water supply such as 
fluoride. 
 
The treatment plants do not represent a critical component in the reliability of 
fire system under short-term failures and commonly exhibit a high level of 
redundancy in the treatment of water in large urban areas.   
 
The remaining water supply headworks system comprises of the transfer and 
storage of the water. The principal methods for these are pipe work, aqueducts, 
and tanks. These components generally represent critical components in the 
supply and their failure affects the reliability trade-offs associated with the 




A water distribution system comprises of the physical components to distribute 
the water from the main pipeline supplies to the point of use. The distribution or 
reticulation systems are made up of a network of enclosed pipes, which can be 
supplement under additional demand by service reservoirs. The service 
reservoirs are typically enclosed tanks located in elevated position to maintain 
pressure within the system during peak demand. Service reservoir can also be 
located ahead of the water treatment plant depend on the topography of the 
system.  
 
The pipe work within the reticulation system represents a critical component in 




Chapter 3. Literature review 
The operation of water supplies are typically divided into three distinct groups: 
the components under the direct control of the building owners, the distribution 
network, and the bulk water network. The operation of these three groups is 
often managed independently. For this reason, research into their reliability has 
been typically conducted in isolation.   
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that a survey of literature and research contained 
very few references that addressed the performance of the entire water supply 
when attached to fire sprinklers. 
 
Studies have looked into the reliability of secondary water supplies while 
conducting quantitative risk assessments into other topics. However, these stop 
at the distribution as the only source of fault in the system. 
 
Thomas et al. (1992) conducted a risk assessment evaluating the reliability of fire 
safety system components. The research was commissioned by BHP‟s research 
division and was conducted during refurbishment of the office building at 140 
Williams Street, Melbourne. The focus of the investigation was the effect that a 
fire would have on the steel structure of the building and the corresponding need 
to apply passive protection to steel structures. This research included estimates 
of the reliability of the town‟s mains and reliability of the components in the 
building‟s water delivery system, such as pumps. 
 
Other studies by Bennetts at al. (1995,1998) were carried out as ongoing 
research by BHP into the effects of fire on steel framed buildings. These studies 
include further estimates of the town‟s mains reliability and the components 
associated with the fire suppression equipment.  
 
Research conducted along a similar line to that of BHP‟s by Feeney (2001) into 
the performance of steel-based structures with sprinklers contained, an estimate 
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of the town‟s mains reliability for Auckland based on data obtained from the 
water authority, Metrowater. Also included was a review of the reliability of 
components associated with sprinkler systems, and an estimate of the reliability 
of the secondary water supplies based on the previous New Zealand sprinkler 
standard (NZS 4541:1996). 
   
Crawley (1993, 1995) described the use of HOMA, a water optimisation model, 
to assess the reliability of the Adelaide bulk transfer system. This research was 
aimed at optimising the reliability of Adelaide‟s water storage against pumping 
costs. Included in this research was a detailed review of the Adelaide bulk water 
transfer and storage systems, along with estimates of the reliability of each of the 
critical components. This aligns closely with the town‟s mains reliability being 
considered in this report, but is limited to Adelaide and does not included 
infrastructure outside the headworks system. 
 
Crawley‟s model allows for the calculation of the length and number of periods 
the system would be without water based on water inflow, demand data, transfer 
costs, and restriction on use. Similar research conducted by Victorian University 
of Technology (Kuczera)  and Monash University (Diment)  have produced 
network modelling tools, WATHNET and REALM that perform similar 
optimisation calculations and are in much wider use than the model created by 
Crawley. 
 
A number of governing authorities use these simulations to plan for the future 
uses and reliability of the water supply system. The South Australian 
Government (2007) and the Sydney Catchment Authority (2006) have produced 
reports that provide a number of water use scenarios and the reliability of the 
supply based on this usage. 
 
Along with research into the systems as a whole, studies have been conducted 
into individual sections of the water supply chain. Donnelly (2006) looked at 
dam walls, Pim (1988) at tanks, and McElhanley (1996) at valves. These provide 




Water retailers provide information of the state of their networks in their annual 
reports. It is interesting to review this data, as the information supplied within 
these report can be used to determine the annual probability of failure for the 
reticulation systems and is comparable to the supply reliability used by Feeney 
(2001), Thomas et al. (1992) and Bennetts et al. (1995,1998). 
 
The assessment of the reliability of the secondary water supply is to be 
conducted specifically on New Zealand based designs. Therefore, it is important 
to review the design requirements for secondary water supplies in New Zealand. 
 
A review of the research into earthquakes was also conducted, as it is considered 
one of the main reasons for the division between Class A and Class B dual water 
supplies under the New Zealand sprinkler standard (NZ 4541:2007). 
 
Adams (2008, 2004) discussed the effects that earthquakes had on dam walls and 
the susceptibility of different locations and construction methods. Ballantyne and 
Crouse (1997) studied the restoration of water supply after an earthquake and the 
probability of failure. Other research has been conducted into the specific 
probability of an earthquake causing damage to water supply infrastructure; a 





Chapter 4. Reliability of Water Supply 
Infrastructure  
 
This chapter of the report is concerned with the components that make up the 
off- and on-site water supply to the fire sprinklers. In this report, off-site 
components are those outside the boundary of the building and not under the 
control of the building‟s owner. On-site components are those within the 
boundaries of the building and controlled directly by the building‟s owner but, 
limited by the scope to those components before the control valve enclosure. 
 
4.1 Reservoir Reliability 
 
To gauge disruptions to the water supply by a failure of a reservoir, data was 
collected on the probability of dam failures indicating the length of time between 
failures. Data on the repairs of dams was not considered as it was assumed that 
repairs could be conducted without disruption to the supply of water.  
 
Donnelly (2006) reviewed data collected from a number of sources on the failure 
rates of dams to determine the nature of the failures and the level of risk 
involved. The data collected showed that annual failure rate of dams from studies 





(failures/year), which equates to a mean time between failures of 1428 to 5000 
years. The average mean time between failures indicated for these reports was 
2500 years.  
 
Also included in this review was the data provided to the Hydro Review. This 
review is the process whereby United States dam failures are reported. The data 
showed that up until 1999 there had been 421 dam failures in the United States 




In comparison, the National Performance of Dams Program (NPDP) operated by 
Stanford University showed that, on average, the mean time between failures of 
dams from 1990 until 2007 was estimated at approximately 2250 years.  
 
Clearly, the failure of a dam is an extremely rare occurrence. However, the 
widespread disruption and the lengthy construction time make these events 
worthy of consideration. 
 
It is also interesting to compare the different dam construction methods to 
investigate whether one is superior to the others. 
 
Donnelly (2006) also looked at the frequency of the failure for different types of 
dam construction. Based on the data collated in the FEMA/ICOLD (1979) , 
Federal Emergency Management Agency / International Commission on Large 
Dams, the report evaluated the frequency of failure as a percentage of the total 
number of dams built by that type. This showed that concrete buttress dam were 
the mostly like to have a failure a 2.6%, followed by; earth and rock filled at 1.2 
%, concrete arch at 0.7% and the least likely to failure was concrete gravity dams 
at 0.3%. This data applies to the incidence of failure of dams reported in the 
United States. 
 
Although, a large majority of the data is sourced from the United States it is 
expected that due to similar construction techniques and maintenance that the 
results for dams within New Zealand would be similar. 
 
For this report, it is estimated that the reliability of a dam wall has a mean time 
to failure of 2500 years.  
 
The construction period of large dams, those over 15 metres tall, covered in this 
report ranges between approximately 1 and 10 years from Crawley (1995) and 
SEQwater. The length of construction is dependent on the wall type and size. 
Risk and Reliability Associates (2009) estimated that the reconstruction of a 
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reservoir in Gladstone, Australia, following a dam wall failure would require 
1000 days. 
 
For this report, it is estimated that the most dam walls could be repaired under 
„crisis‟ conditions in 1000 days. 
 
4.2 Pipe 
During research into the headworks systems a number of key components were 
identified: 
 Surge protection on the pipe 
 On-line storage 
 Energy dissipation valves 
 Pipes 
 
Surge protection is design to prevent damage to the pipeline during an 
unscheduled shutdown. If the surge protection fails or is taken out of service the 
system will still function. 
 
On-line storage is provided to prevent a system failure under short-term outages. 
The online shortage can be by-passed in the event of a failure. However, this will 
reduce the supply‟s resilience to other outages. 
 
The energy dissipation valves are used to dissipate the hydraulic energy, a result 
of the difference in head on a closed section of pipe between the elevated storage 
and the distribution points. The design of these discharge valves allows for a 
number of redundant pathways to ensure that the supply remains unaffected in 
the event of a failure.  
 
Crawly (1995) estimated that in the event of a major rupture of a section of the 
bulk transfer pipeline the system would be offline for a week and under “crisis” 
condition and that this could be repaired in one to two days. Based on the repair 
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time the author felt the further investigation into pipe failures was not considered 
necessary in the examination of the bulk water transfer. Crawley‟s report was 
considering the transfer of water between dams and it was estimated that outages 
of less than seven days could be absorbed by the available storage.  
 
Consideration must also be given to the pipelines connecting supply elements 
such as pumping stations and dams to the treatment plants. These pipelines have 
much less online storage available and even a short outage will have an effect on 
the supply reliability especially at peak demand. 
 
On this basis, further investigation of these pipelines is the only element that 
needs consideration in the bulk water transfer system. 
 
Price Waterhouse Coopers in an audit of the South East Queensland water asset 
found that breakages to main distribution pipes occurred at a rate of between 
5.91/100km and 8.91/100km.  
 
The data for pipe breakages covered in these audit inherently includes the 
physical and environment causes of pipe breakage. Al-Barqawi noted these 
environmental and physical factors when producing a model of the deterioration 
of pipes. 
 
Physical causes included: 
 Pipe type 
 Diameter of the pipe 
 Age and 
 Breakage rate 
 
Environmental factors included: 
 Cathodic protection 
 Ground water level  
 Soil type surface type 
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 Road type 
 
The age of the pipes and the pipe material had the highest contribution to the 
deterioration of the pipes. 
 
For this report, it is estimated the breakages per km of pipe in the bulk transfer 
system is 0.07 (break/km) and the mean outage time for these breaks is assumed 
to be 90 minutes; estimated from the Nation Water Commission data that 
appears later in this chapter. The use of values from collected data was favoured 
of model data due to the complexity of the data required for the age, size and soil 
type (breakage rate) used to model a single water supply.  
 
4.3 Pump  
 
A number of components in the pumping stations were identified as critical 
components in the operation of the transfer system. These included the electrical 
side and the pumps themselves: 
 Power feed  
 Transformers  and switchboard 
 Pump motor and pump 
 
The reliability of the power feed is determined later for a number of different 
locations and produced an availability of 99.965 %. (see section 4.6) 
 
Estimates of the transformer and switchboard reliability were made for 
Adelaide‟s bulk water transfer by Crawley (1995). These values are used in the 
report unchanged.  
 
It was assumed that there would be little variation in the probability of failure of 
a large electric pump, used for bulk water transfer, versus a smaller electric 
pump used as a fire pump. The probability of failure of pumps appears to vary 
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little across a range of sizes and applications from the data collected in the 
electric pump section (see section 4.7.1) of this report.   
 
The on-line storage between pumping station and the distribution system allows 
for failures of less than a week to be disregarded. This boosts the reliability of 
the pumps as maintenance can be performed without a loss of supply. However, 
unlike the electric pumps used to boost the sprinkler system, the water supply 
pumps are run all the time at varying capacities.  
 
Crawley (1995) estimated that the pump would have failure frequency of 1 in  20 
years with a mean repair time of 7 days and the attached motor would have a 
failure frequency of 1 in 50 years and a 14 day repair time. 
 
The failure frequency of the pump is consistent with that reported in Hydraulic 
Institute, which report the life span of pumps as between 15-20 years. 
 
The availability of electric pumps and motors uses in this report for elements of 
the headworks was assumed to be 0.9998. This is calculated from the 7 days of 
repair time required every 20 years that was reported in Crawley. 
4.4 Water treatment plants 
 
As mentioned in the background, the main function of the water treatment plant 
is to clarify and decontaminate the water. A failure of either or both of these 
functions will have little short-term impact of the reliability of the water supply 
to the sprinkler system. Like many of the components in the headworks system, 
the water treatment plant can be by-passed to ensure continuation of supply.   
 
Figure 25 in Appendix C shows the protocol for the treatment of water in the 
event that the water treatment plant fails. These measures are consistent with 
New Zealand water treatment protocol outlined by the Ministry of Health (2001). 
If water cannot be treated within the plant, consideration is typically given to 
25 
 
issuing a notice for water to be boiled by consumers and not a shutdown of 
supply.   
 
There are some circumstance in which the water supply will be completely 
turned off. These include when introduced chemical levels reach a pre-defined 
limit, however, these shut downs can be usually rectified within the time span 
allowed by the on-line storage. For these reasons, the impact on the failure of the 
water treatment plants is not included in this report.  
 
4.5 Distribution (reticulation system) 
 
To assess the potential for disruption to the town‟s main, data was collected from 
the Australian Government‟s National Water Commission (NWC), which 
includes data from most of the Australian water authorities but also contains 
some data from New Zealand. The data from the NWC covers the period from 
July 2002 until the last recorded report in June 2007. Listed in this data is the 
total number of properties connected to the authorities water supply, customer 
interruption frequency (per 1000 properties), water main breaks (per 100km), the 
length of the water mains, and the period of the interruption.  
 
The interruptions recorded are defined by the NWC as a total loss of water 
supply due to any cause, both planned and unplanned. Unplanned outages covers 
shutdowns due to such causes as unscheduled repairs or ruptures; planned 
shutdowns cover periods of outages due to maintenance and repair of the 
network as well as outages due to new connections being installed and upgrades 
to existing pipe network. 
 
Up until 2005-2006, reporting of all the values required to assess the reliability 
of the water supply was not commonplace and as of the end of reporting in 2009, 
some of the major water authorities still do not publish data on the duration of 
the shutdown. However, this is a small minority of the total number of suppliers 
and this appear to be changing with many of the councils and water authorities 
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that are not collecting this data, reporting that it is being collected for the 2010 
collection period. 
 
As noted previously another source of data was from Feeney (2001), however, 
when Feeney collected this data for Auckland from Metrowater it was partially 
incomplete, as it did not have the planned outages recorded for the first twelve 
months. In a back-to-back comparison, it was shown that there was little 
variation (1x 10
-5
) in the availability of the supply due to the inclusion of this 
incomplete data. As there is little difference in the values, the shorter period of 
complete data is used herein. 
 
The table below shows a comparison of the figures obtained by Feeney for the 
Auckland supply, from Metrowater, compared to the results from the NCW for 
Brisbane‟s water supply. 
 
Table 2 Summary of results for Brisbane Water from NWC and Metrowater (Auckland) from 
Feeney. 
Location Brisbane Auckland 
Period covered June 2006 to July 2007 November 1997 to  April 2000 





frequency (note Auckland 
over 2.4 years) 
144.7 513.32 





(minutes per year) 
26 38 
 
Frequency of shutdowns   4.98 x 10
-5
 7.3 x 10
-5
 
Water supply reliability  99.995%  (0.99995) 99.993% ( 0.99993) 
 
The results from Auckland and Brisbane show the similarity in water 
distributions reliability but are also largely similar in shutdown length and 
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customer interruption frequency, when the Auckland value is adjusted to a single 
year. 
 
As the distribution (reticulation) plays such a significant role in the reliability, 
more analysis was conducted to ensure that no outliers or erroneous values were 
present in the data. The results of all the supplies with over fifty thousand 
connection in Australia are tabulated below; the second figure plots the 
histogram of these supplies. 
 
 
The remaining collected data for supplies under fifty thousand connections 
appears in Appendix E. These smaller cities exhibit a higher level of reliability 
than distribution networks found in the city with over fifty thousand connections. 
This is likely due to the smaller distances of pipes being easier to manage and a 
more disperse population resulting in less connections affected by a single failure 
in the distribution network.  
 
Supplies with connection over fifth thousand was used as the default value for 
data from the NWC as it represents a slightly more conservative value than the 
average for all connection complied by the NWC.
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Figure 4 Water Supplies with over 50,000 connections. Data from NWC (2007) 
Water Supply  














breaks (per 100 
km of water 
main ) 
Length of water 
mains (km)  
Average duration 
of an unplanned 
interruption- 






year (minutes) Reliability 
Utility                 
 ACTEW  140 140.7 47.4          3,007  69.1 10 1.85E-05 0.999981 
 Barwon Water  127 214.8 -           3,431  126.7 27 5.19E-05 0.999948 
 Brisbane Water  435 144.7 49.7          6,340  180.7 26 4.99E-05 0.999950 
 City West Water  324 305.0 85.7          4,150  119.0 36 6.92E-05 0.999931 
 Hunter Water  217 370.0 37.4          4,638  176.4 65 1.25E-04 0.999875 
 South East Water  616 208.6 23.5          8,496  88.2 18 3.51E-05 0.999965 
 Sydney Water  1721 0.3 34.5        20,824  118.6 0 5.79E-08 1.000000 
 WC - Perth  680 63.5 13.1        12,527  145.0 9 1.76E-05 0.999982 
 Yarra Valley Water  651 303.9 57.3          9,018  84.3 26 4.89E-05 0.999951 
Central Highlands 
Water  57 114.4 25.1          2,164  108.8 12.5 2.37E-05 0.999976 
 Coliban Water  65 80.0 42.1          2,115  112.5 9.0 1.72E-05 0.999983 
 Gippsland Water  59 163.0 36.6          2,001  93.7 15.3 2.91E-05 0.999971 
 Gosford  69 280.0 36.4             946  62.7 17.6 3.35E-05 0.999967 
 Goulburn Valley  51 180.1 3.9          1,677  121.0 21.9 4.16E-05 0.999958 
 Logan Water  66 37.9 11.0          1,257  39.6 1.5 2.86E-06 0.999997 
 Wyong  58 32.9 4.0          1,107  150.0 4.9 9.42E-06 0.999991 
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Values of note, from the data are the extremely small number of customer 
interruptions in Sydney and the low availability of the Hunter Water supply.  
 
The values for the customer interruption frequency for Sydney are consistently 
low across a number of years. There are a number of factors, which affect the 
number of interruption experienced by a customer such as age of pipes, level of 
maintenance, amount of rain and soil type. Under the right condition, these can 
lead to the low level of interruption experienced in Sydney and since this is 
consistent over a number of years, this value is not considered an outlier. 
 
The high level of disruption experience in the Hunter water supply is due to the 
high number of customer interruptions and the long duration in repairing of the 
ruptures and leaks. However, both of these values are consistent for a number of 
years and with the peak values reported for other regions. 
 
There is a small possibility that an event within the distribution network would 
coincide with an outage elsewhere in the system. Since this value was assumed 
to be independent of the other outages there is a possibility that an event may be 
doubled up. For example, a pumping failure in the secondary water supply, 
failing at the same time as a pipe in the distribution network. Most of these 
duplicated events are accounted for when the failures are simulated in the Monte 
Carlo model and the small effect that these concurrent events produce will result 
in a more conservative result. 
 
The NWC data and the values obtained by Feeney are the result of data collected 
over a period of one to three years. The result is an average annual value for the 
reliability of the water supply that does not take into account shorter period 
seasonal variations. Although this additional data would be useful in determining 
the variation in the reliability of the distribution network at a particular season or 
month, the average annual reliability obtained from the data remains consistent 




The analysis of the reliability of the water supply conducted here does not 
account for long-term variations in the reliability of the water distribution 
network. Some of these long-term variations such as drought can be accounted 
for by using the previously described network models, which take into account a 
much longer period of data collected from the inflow variation in a supply. There 
are effects that cannot be accounted for with other models or data, however, 
these effects typically result in small changes to the overall reliability. 
 
The greater availability of reported data in Australia on water supply 
interruptions means that most of the analysis here is conducted outside of the 
New Zealand water supply network, with the exception of Auckland. It does not 
necessarily correlate that the values for Australia will apply to those in New 
Zealand. However, values for the water distribution reliability are consistent 
across a broad range of locations within Australia and those obtained for 
Auckland. This level of consistency is likely due to both New Zealand and 
Australia having the infrastructure and workforce in place to respond rapidly to 
disruptions in the water supply network and preventative maintenance in place to 
reduce occurrences of unplanned outages. 
 
Bennetts et al. (1995) in their investigation into 140 William Street, Melbourne, 
also assessed the reliability of suburban Melbourne‟s water mains. It was 
reported that 90% of outages were repaired within 5 hours. This is consistent 
with the data obtained for the current length of repair time for Melbourne. The 












Table 3 Comparison of Water Supply Availability 
 1995 Figures  













 3.51 x 10
-5




per year per customer 
31 minutes 18 minutes 36 minutes 







The results from the 1995 Bennetts et al. study compares well with more recently 
reported figures for suburban Melbourne water supplies. The values are also 
comparable to the previous discussed figures for Auckland (99.993%) 
 
The average value for the cities of over fifty thousand connections was used.  
4.6 Electricity 
 
As part of the potential interruption to the water supplied from electric pumps, 
failure data was collected for the reliability of electrical supplies across Australia 
and New Zealand to indicate the frequency of the possible shutdowns of the 
electricity supply.  
 
The frequency of shut downs is reported by the electricity suppliers (Orion 
Group (2009), Energex (2009), Gibbons (2008) and Ergon (2009)) as the System 
Average Interruption Duration Index, SAIDI. This represents the average total 
duration of the electricity supply interruptions, in minutes, experienced by an 
average customer due to unplanned and planned outages within a reporting 
period. Normally this is calculated on a yearly basis between the annual 




SAIDI can be used to calculate the availability of the power to the customer or 
ASAI (Average service availability) on an annual basis, by using the equation: 
 
      
                       
                 
  
 
Data collected from Western Power (Western Australia), Energex (South East 
Queensland), Ergon (South West Queensland) and Orion (Canterbury) has been 
analysed to show the availability of supply. The data collected relates to outage 
covering the period of July 2005 until June 2009.  
 
The results show a clear difference between the reliability of power supply to 
CBD, urban and rural areas. This is not surprising given the increase in 
connection distance between customers in urban and rural area when compared 








Table 4 Summary of Electricity Supply Availability 








99.96 99.95 99.95 99.94 99.95 
Availability 
% WA Rural 





















   99.98 99.98 






The United States Department of Agriculture (2009) suggested that a goal for 
rural utilities within the United States might be an availability of “four nines” or 
99.99%. This is consistent with urban areas of Queensland (99.98%, 99.96%) 
and Western Australia (99.95%) but is an order of magnitude above that found in 
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rural Western Australia (99.89%). However, the lower level of reliability in rural 
Western Australia is not surprising given the extremely low population density. 
The electrical reliability, like the water supply reliability, is not a measure of the 
quality of supply. It only pertains to sustained interruptions and not voltage 
fluctuation, abnormal waveforms or harmonic distortion. Interruptions of greater 
than 5 minutes are general considered a reliability issue, whilst interruptions of 
less than five minutes are considered a power quality issue. As a result of this, 
there will be a tendency to underestimate the total time of power outage and over 
estimate the reliability of the power supply. 
 
The average reliability of the electricity supply was used, 0.99965, as it 
represents a more conservative result and covers the underestimation from 
quality issues. It is possible to the create a distribution from the data. This could 
then be used in the Monte Carlo simulation to place a value on the uncertainty in 
the model. However, to remain consistent with a majority of the data within the 
research this value was left as a discrete availability figure.   
 
4.7 Components in the secondary supply  
 
4.7.1  Electric pumps 
In the assessment of 140 Williams Street, Melbourne, Thomas (1992) evaluated 
the probability of failure of the pumping components within the sprinkler‟s water 
supply. Included in this analysis, were the failures of an electric pump due to 
unavailability of mains power, faulty pressure switch to start the pump, and 
faulty electric pump. 
 
Feeney (2001) summarised the results of this study and noted that the variations 
in the probability of failure of a Building Code of Australia designed building 
and a refurbished building were attributable to the differences in maintenance 
levels of the fire equipment. The Australian study was also modified by Feeney 
to reflect the stricter maintenance requirements in New Zealand that were in 
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place at the time the reports were written. This result in a reliability for electric 
pump tabulated below: 
Table 5 Adjusted Electric Pumps 
 Probability of electric pump not working 
BCA Building (Thomas et al) 7 x 10
-2
 
Refurbished Building (Thomas et al) 1.5 x 10
-3
 




For comparison, results for electric fire pumps from Idaho National Engineering 
and Lees (2005) were used to estimate the probability of failure of an electric 
pump. Both these assessments relate to the nuclear industry; while not directly 
applicable to water supplies in New Zealand they do provide for a comparison of 
well-maintained pumping systems. However, unlike the Thomas and Feeney data 
these reports do not include factors outside faulty electrical pumps, such as 
electrical supply interruption and pressure switch failures.  
 
An estimation of the electricity supply interruptions are provided above and an 
estimate of the switch‟s failure rate was obtained from Allen (1998) of 0.04552 
failures per year. The result is an annual probability of failure of 2.14 x 10
-4
 for 
an electric fire pump installed with a nuclear power plant with “standard” 
electricity and switch reliability. This estimation is significantly more reliable 
when compared with the results the Feeney extrapolated from the Australian 
data. However, this is to be expected of systems installed in the nuclear industry. 
 
For this report, Feeney‟s estimate of the annual probability of an electric pump 
was used, 99.8% or 0.998. 
4.7.2  Diesel reliability 
As noted previously, both Feeney (2001) and Thomas (1995) looked in to the 
reliability of pumps. It is interesting to compare reliability of the diesel pumps 
sourced from a number of different locations and industries to get a broader look 




The first of these is the Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA) database that 
contains data collected by eight oil and gas companies in a wide range of 
components and systems used in the offshore platforms. The data collection 
started in 1984 and represents data from several geographical locations.  
 
Along with the oil and gas industries, the nuclear industry provides detailed 
reliability data on a wide range of components and system installed in nuclear 
power plants across Europe and the United States.  
 
The data is from the nuclear and oil and gas industries and whilst in the area of 
diesel fire pumps it will not be strictly comparable to the average New Zealand 
situation due to the differences environmental conditions and the levels of 
maintenance. However, they do provide a good point of reference to compare the 
values obtained by Thomas and amended by Feeney. 
 
Table 6 Diesel Pump Reliability 
Report Annual probability of Failure 
  





4.8  x10 
-4
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The values from OREDA, Ketron, and Idaho National Engineering laboratory 
were reported as a mean time between repairs. This needs to be transformed into 
an annual probability of failure for comparison to the results from Feeney.  
 
The oil and gas industry results reported in OREDA are in the lower range of 
reliability and are close to those reported by Feeney for a BCA building. As 
would be expected of a high-risk environment, the nuclear power plant‟s fire 
pump reliability falls in a range offering higher reliability. The variation in the 
values reported in nuclear power plants is indicative of pumps that would be 
found in building applications, with maintenance playing a large role in the 
reliability of a diesel pump.   
 
The value for the annual probability of failure of a diesel pump was taken as 1.6 
x 10
-3
. This represent the probability a diesel motor will not start or will failure 
during it operation and was taken from Thomas via Feeney. 
 
4.7.3  Valves 
The New Zealand standard specifies the valves that must be connected to the 
primary and secondary water supplies. The table below shows the expected 
failure rate of these valves. 
 
Table 7 Valve Reliability from McElhanley (1996) 
Type Failure rate  (failures/ year) 
Check  0.0133  
Stop Valve  0.002 
4.7.4  Tanks 
Elevated water tanks make up one of the three alternatives for a primary supply 
source, however, tanks may also be installed in a non-elevated position when a 
pump is attached. To gauge the availability of water supplied from these sources, 
the construction material used, the location (Elevated, in-ground or on- ground) 
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of the tank, and the amount of time that the tanks is empty have been analysed to 
indicate the annual probability of failure of tanks.   
 
Australian and New Zealand Standard, AS/NZ 4766:2006, covers the 
construction of polyethylene storage tanks and requires the tanks be constructed 
to have a design life of 10 years. However, the Standard does not cover the 
installation of tanks underground. To append the Standard,  Water Services 
Association of Australia (WSAA) have created a report, WSA 128, with the 
objective of providing design, manufacturing and performance for buried 
rainwater tanks, where recommendations are not available under the Australian 
and New Zealand Standards. Recommendations are provided for two different 
criteria: 
 
 Tanks installed clear of any building and away from structural element –a 
design life of 25 years is recommended 
 Tanks installed under or close to building where structural elements of 
the building may be affected – a design life of 50 years is recommended 
The WSAA recommendations cover the installation of glass fibre, plastic and 
concrete tanks. 
In comparison to the of the recommendation by the WSAA, De Walle (1981) 
found that for concrete septic tanks the failure rate was between 1 and 5% per 
year. If, the failure rate of the tanks is treated as an exponential curve. A failure 
rate of between 1% and 5% at the end of the first year yields a mean time to 
failure of 99.45 years and 19.5 years. However, this excluded the effects of a 
burn-in period were a large number of failures are likely to occur during 
commissioning.  
 
The results from DeWalle (1981) are confirmed in a study conducted by the 
Philadelphia Suburban Water Company into the life cycle costing of concrete vs. 
steel tanks, which showed concrete tanks in service with the Philadelphia 
suburban Water Company had service life of 48 years with repairs conducted 20 
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years into service. The results also showed that the steel tanks had a service life 
of over 45 years with repairs conducted 17 years into operation. The main 
determination to end the use concrete tank was cost of the repairs, and operation 
and not the failure of the tank.  
 
The data from these studies falls into a range above the typical warranties for 
commercially available tanks with plastic tanks having a typically warranty 
period  of around the 25 years, coated steel 20 years and concrete 15 years. 
 
Mean time to failure was estimated at 50 years for non-elevated and 25 year for 
elevated. The repair time of elevated and on-ground tanks was estimated at 1 day 
under “crisis” and 3 days for underground tanks. 
4.8 Weather and Natural disasters events 
 
The data collected so far does not include long-term natural events such as 
earthquakes. The incidences of these natural events are typically rare and are not 
always of a magnitude to result in damage to the water system. However, the 
consequence of these rare events can be severe and are not statistically 
independent. These events may produce damage to almost every component of 
the water supply system (water tanks, town‟s main, pumping station, etc.) and 
some of these events may result in a fire occurring.  
 
When looking at the effect that natural disasters have on the supply system a 
number of events were considered: 
 Icing or snow damage to pipes or supply source; 







Damage from snow or ice and contamination to the supply was disregarded due 
to the limited effect on the supply. Mitigation allows for the intakes to be moved 
below contamination or for the contamination to be treated. Similarly, icing of 
rivers and lakes can be mitigated with design. 
 
Although the occurrence of earthquakes are rare, the propensity is for damage to 
be spread over a wide range of the water supply infrastructure. This coupled with 
the threat of fire caused by the earthquake leads to its detailed inclusion in the 
review. 
 
The exhaustion of water during droughts is as much about the operation of the 
water supply as it is about the weather around the catchment areas. For this 
reason, water authorities typically conduct extensive modelling on the reliability 
of the water storage, evaluating the level of storage against usage trade-offs. This 
coupled with non-independence of secondary supply such as tanks, rivers, and 




The New Zealand sprinkler standard recognises the increased threat from the 
ground motion during earthquakes and requires that building in earthquake prone 
areas, a hazard zone greater than 0.13 and taller than 25m, have a Class A water 
supply. This includes two independent supplies only one of which is reliant on 
the town‟s main and reduces the amount of ground pipe work install around the 
building. 
 
However, earthquake damage does not just affect the pipe network around 
buildings. A large portion of the headworks is susceptible to earthquake damage 
and must be included into this research. 
 
The likelihood of a loss of integrity of a reservoir varies depends on the method 
of construction, the age, and the quality of the workmanship. Lin and Adams 
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(2008) noted that of the 133 dams in the Canadian hydroelectric scheme that 
earth/rock filled dams were considered more vulnerable to earthquakes than 
concrete dams. This is backed-up by the ATC (1995) which applies a damage 
state to each construction method based on the MMI (Modified Mercalli 
Intensities), a measure of earthquake intensity.  
 
Since the dams considered in Lin and Adams (2008) study were constructed 
between 1910 and 1996, it was considered necessary to account for the age of the 
dam in their vulnerability to earthquakes. Older dams built before 1930 having 
been constructed with no seismic consideration and those constructed between 
1953 and 1985 having been constructed to a much lower seismic hazard than 
current requirements. A differentiation was also made between the seismic 
regions of Canada with dams in Western and Eastern Canada having different 
exposures. The result was that dams constructed pre-1930 out of earth-fill in 
Western Canada (highest risk) had an annual probability of sustaining slight 
damage of 0.00126. While, an earth-fill constructed in Eastern Canada in the 
1950‟s (ranked 17
th
) had an annual probability of slight damage of 0.00088. 
 
Ballantyne and Crouse (1997) noted that following the Loma Prieta and 
Northridge earthquakes in California and the Kobe earthquake in Japan there was 
major loss of water supply. In these earthquakes, the pipelines in both 
distribution and transmission of water failed and the reservoirs drained. 
 
It was also shown that historically the major cause of system failure relates to the 
damage of the bulk water transfer and the distribution pipe network. Other 
failures occurred in the treatment plants, pumping stations, tanks, power systems, 
and building structure. A loss of power was identified as the greatest failure 
mechanism. However, it was found that the water treatment plants and pumping 
station failures contributed only as secondary cause of the system failure.  
 
The report states that anchored tanks generally perform well during earthquakes, 
provided they are design transfer force from the shell into the foundations. 




Ballantyne and Crouse presented a risk assessment of the failure of a water 
system in California. An adaptation of the fault tree presented in their report 
along with the values for the failures appears in Appendix C. The fault trees have 
been modified for the supply condition present in this report with the omission of 
treatment plant failures relating to water quality and the modifications to allow 
for the infrastructure consistent with those present here. 
 






Whilst the research was conducted into areas of California and Canada, the 
infrastructure is similar to that that appears in New Zealand. The magnitude and 
intensity of earthquakes in California and Canada will differ from those in the 
New Zealand. However, this is also true of earthquakes within different regions 
of New Zealand as illustrated by the Figure 6, which shows the MMI for a 475-
year return period. 
 
As a consequence of the seismic activities, pipes within the town‟s distribution 
system and those within a properties‟ supply can be damaged, limiting the 
availability of water. While Ballantyne and Crouse recognised this threat and 
provided an estimate of the reliability of the distribution and bulk transfer, the 
site main required a failure rate based on the length of pipe installed. PAHO 
(1998) recognised this need and used the 1991 Limón earthquake in Costa Rica 
to estimate the expected number of breaks in pipelines affected by seismic 
activity.  
 
PAHO studied the vulnerability of pipes under a number of conditions and 
expressed their failure rate in terms of breaks per kilometre. The factors that 
affected the pipes failure rate included the profile of the soil, the potential for 
liquefaction, and the intensity of the earthquake these factors resulted in the 
calculation a seismic hazard factor for a location.  
 
Table 8 Soil Profile – taken from PAHO (1998) 
Soil Profile Description Hazard 
Rocky Rocky Strata, or soil with wave propagation greater than 750 
m/s 
1.0 
Hard Well consolidated or soft soil to depth of less than 5 metres 1.5 







Table 9 Liquefaction Hazard– taken from PAHO (1998) 
Liquefaction Description Hazard 
Low High drainage, low sand, and well consolidated soil. 1.0 
Moderate Moderate draining soil with moderate sand content. 1.5 
High Poor drainage, high water table, and high sand content. 2.0 
 
 
Table 10 Permanent Displacement Hazard– taken from PAHO (1998) 
Displacement Description Hazard 
Low Low slope, well compacted fill not near river or faults 1.0 
Moderate Slope less than 25% compacted fill close to river or fault 1.5 




The values are multiplied together to produce the seismic hazard factor. PAHO 
suggested that a value of less than 2 for the seismic hazard factor represents a 
low seismic hazard, values between two and four a moderate seismic hazard, and 
values equal to or greater than 4 a high seismic hazard. 
 
This seismic hazard can be coupled with the Modified Mercalli Intensity, shown 
in Error! Reference source not found. for New Zealand, to produce the 
xpected number of failures per kilometre of pipe. The number of breaks caused 
by an earthquake in cast iron pipes for the different Modified Mercalli Intensity 
is given in Table 11.  
 
Table 11 Pipe fault per km based on Hazard– taken from PAHO (1998) 
Mercalli intensity 
Faults per kilometre 
Seismic Hazard Factor < 2 Seismic Hazard Factor > 2 
VI 0.0015 0.01 
VII 0.015 0.09 
VIII 0.15 0.55 
IX 0.35 4.00 




The values can be modified away from cast iron to other material using the 
conversion table shown below. 
 
Table 12 Conversion for Pipe Material– taken from PAHO (1998) 
Material Correction factor 
Steel 0.25 
Cast Iron 1.00 
PVC 1.50 
Asbestos Cement 2.60 
Reinforced concrete 2.60 
 
Modification to the breakages per kilometre to allow for the age of the pipes can 
add up to an additional 50% for old/poor condition pipes. As narrower pipes are 
more susceptible to breakage, an additional 50% can be added for sub 75mm 
pipe and  25% for pipes between 75mm and 200mm.    
 
O'Rourke and Bouabid (1996) applied a similar approach to concrete pipe 
damage in Mexico City due to the 1985 Michoacán event, an earthquake with an 
MMI of between VIII and IX. This produced an estimate of the damage ratio of 
0.3 to 0.5 repairs per kilometre. This compares to values calculated using PAHO 
method of 0.39 to 0.91 breaks per kilometre for a low seismic hazard. The 
greater range is large due to the discrete steps in the earthquake intensity used by 
PAHO. 
 
Shinozuka asserted that the occurrence of these pipe breaks followed a Poisson 
distribution. It was also stated that there are four states of pipe breakage; no 
breaks (no damage), one or two breaks (minor damage), three to five breaks 
(moderate damage) and equal to or greater than six breaks (major damage).  
 
A Monte Carlo simulation based on the probability of the pipe having minor 
damage through to major damage was coupled with the breakage per km to 




Given the variability in the inputs for the magnitude of the earthquakes, the 
locations, and the infrastructure involved, the probabilistic assessments here can 
only give an estimate of the magnitude of the effect earthquakes have on the 
water supply. However, attempts have been made to cover the highest proportion 
of this variability by covering the soil condition with the model of the pipe 
breakages. 
 
The seismic forces covered under the New Zealand Code of Practice for General 
Design and Design Loadings for Buildings NZS 4203:1992 includes an accepted 
exceedance factor of 0.1 in the 50 year design life.  This exceedance probability 
yields a similar return period to the values used in Figure 6 and represents an 
annual exceedance probability of 0.0021 for seismic and gravity forces. 
4.8.2 Drought 
 
The statistics collated for the distribution and storage of water so far do not cover 
the longer-term effects of weather on the system. Although, the occurrence of 
drought in New Zealand is relatively rare occurrence, variability in weather 
patterns can even affect areas with relativity high rainfall. The capacity of the 
storage is related to the climatic condition as well as the demand placed, by the 
consumer, on the water supply system. This demand will vary with the climatic 
conditions, with these variations also affecting the inflow into the reservoirs. 
During hot dry periods, demand would be expected to be high and inflow would 
be expected to be low. For this reason, it is beneficial to have a close 
management of the supply.   
 
The strategic management of these supplies has also changed in recent times in 
part due to concerns about the public health of drinking water, the decline in the 
reservoir location, and the environmental impact of construction of new dams 
and reservoirs. This transition has lead water authorities to focus on achieving 




As a consequence of the closer management of the water supplies, service 
standards are being designed to ensure supply continuity and to limit the duration 
and frequency of water restrictions and shortages. With the aid of network 
modelling programmes such as WATHNET and REALM the resilience of the 
water supply to drought can be assessed and adjusted on a daily basis. 
Thus the ability for a supply network to resist drought is as much a result of the 
cost of suppling the water and the restrictions placed on it usage as it is the 
amount of inflow into the supply. Therefore, the reliability of the systems is 
often the result of a yield being placed on a system to account for population 
growth, cost, and drought and still meet the service standards. The infrastructure 
and system design are typically modified around this yield to ensure supply. 
 
A review of the Sydney water system in 2007 estimated that for a snapshot of the 
yield status in December 2006, that the limiting factor in supply was the security 
yield. The security yield was defined as maximum amount of water that could be 
extracted out of the storage system such that reservoirs did not approach empty 
(less than 5% capacity ) more than 0.001% of the time.  
 
In comparison, a review of the assets in Greater Wellington‟s water supply 
showed, that for the current supply targets, that sufficient water would be 
available on a daily basis to meet the 1 in 50 year return period of a drought 
situation with additional hosing restriction in place.  
 
The probability of the water supply being unable to extract water is less than the 
0.001% expressed in the Sydney review as the yield available is dynamic and as 
water supplies approach exhaustion restriction applied on its use become more 
severe. However, the Wellington supply is only set to meet a drought with a 1 in 
50 year return period. This offers only an insight in to reliability over a much 
short period than that of the Sydney supply. 
 
It is assumed that the probability of the water supply being exhausted of water 
because of drought is 1 x 10
-4
. This roughly equates to a loss of supply for three 
and half days ever one hundred years. This is only an estimate and aims to cover 
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a wide range of supply sources under the same level of accuracy provided for 
other components in the system. For a specific location, it would be possible to 
extract the daily data from one of the network models to produce a more site-
specific result. 
 
Chapter 5. Analysis up to the premises  
5.1 Adelaide Case Study 
 
It is important to verify that the values obtained in chapter 4 can be used to 
generate data that reflects the interruptions in a real water supply. In order to 
verify these potential interruptions, a comparison was made to the values 
obtained by Crawley (1995) for the Adelaide water supply.  
 
The data compared covers the northern metropolitan water supply and storage 
system of Adelaide, which is comprised of three sub-groups: the South Para 
subsystem, the Little Para subsystem and the Torrens subsystem.  
Figure 7 shows the area supplied by: 
 South Para/ Little Para subsystems  
o Barossa and Little Para water treatment plants  
 Millbrook and Mannum-Adelaide pipeline (Torrens System)  
o Anstey Hill treatment plant 
 Hope Valley Reservoir (Torrens system) 
o Hope Valley treatment plants   
 
The supply and storage of water provided by these subsystems are very different. 
The Torrens systems supply of water comes principally from the Murray River 
through a series of pumping stations. While, the South Para subsystem is a series 
of reservoirs that are interconnected through rivers and pipes. During the 
summer months, the South Para reservoir is supplemented by water collected in 




The water supply from these water treatment plants is assumed to supply only 
the areas marked. In reality, the boundaries of the treatment zones would be less 
defined with these boundaries overlapping. However, it is more conservative to 
assume that only a single supply is feeding water into these areas. This is 
considered realistic for most areas in the supply. 
 
Figure 7 Water Treatment Zone for Adelaide defined by South Australian Government’s online 




The three subsystems and four water treatment plants that comprise the northern 
metropolitan water supply and the four demand centres, which they serve, are 
shown in the schematic in Figure 8. While not shown on the schematic, there are 
some much smaller online demand centres, which are fed from the upper reaches 




























Pumping Station  Water Treatment plant 
 




At this stage, the components used to balance the levels of the dams can be 
disregarded (shown in Figure 8 with dashes). The reliability of these bulk 
transfer lines falls under calculations made in the optimisation of the system, and 
their reliability is included in the probability of the dam holding sufficient water 
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Refer to figure 7 
 
Anstey Hill Treatment 
Zone – Refer to figure 
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5.1.1  South Para Subsystem 
 
The South Para branch of the Adelaide system is made up of three reservoirs:  
 Warren Reservoir 
 South Para Reservoir 
 Barossa Reservoir 
 
The Warren Reservoir was constructed during the years 1914 to 1916 on the 
South Para River to provide storage and supply to the Barossa Valley. The 
reservoir is supplemented by water pumped in via the Swan Reach-Stockwell 
(2020 ML/month) and Mannum Adelaide Pipelines (420 ML/month). The dam 
wall is a concrete gravity construction and the reservoir holds 4.77 GL. The 
Warren Reservoir is connected through spillways and rivers to the South Para 
Reservoir. The reservoir and spillways are design such that the Warren Reservoir 
will spill over into the much larger South Para Reservoir in the late winter 
months of most years. 
 
The South Para Reservoir was constructed during the years 1948 to 1958 on the 
confluence of the Malcolm and Victoria Creeks. The dam wall is a rolled fill 
dam wall, which holds approximately ten times the capacity of the Warren 
Reservoir at 44.8GL. The reservoir is situated 350 metres above the demand 
centre in Adelaide and is connected to the South Para Reservoir by a diversion 
tunnel and aqueduct off the Barossa Weir, the Barossa Reservoir is the final 
storage point in the South Para system.  
 
The Barossa Reservoir was constructed between 1899 and 1902 the reservoir is 
separated from local catchment to improve water quality. The reservoir was not 
linked into the northern metropolitan supply until 1940. When the first of two 
trunk lines were built. The reservoir holds 4.51 GL behind a concrete arch wall 
and is situated 250 metres above Adelaide, which allows water to be gravity fed 




The Barossa Reservoir feeds into the Barossa water treatment plant which has a 
capacity of 160 ML/day. This matches the supply available through the trunk 
mains. 
 
5.1.2  Little Para Subsystem 
 
The Little Para Reservoir is the most recent addition to the Adelaide supply. It is 
located on the Little Para River at an altitude of approximately 200m above the 
demand centres in metropolitan Adelaide. It was commissioned in 1979, with a 
dam wall constructed of concrete faced rock and a capacity of 20.8GL. The Little 
Para reservoir is used as a ground water recharge with supplemental water 
supplied from a branch off the Mannum-Adelaide pipeline. The primary function 
of the Little Para Reservoir, however, is to act as a balancing storage (this 
enables water to be retained during winter, when demand is less than supply, and 
utilised at peak periods during summer) for the South Para Reservoir.  
   
Water treatment is conducted at the Little Para treatment plant, which was 
constructed in 1984. The plant has an identical supply rate as that of the South 
Para Treatment Plant of 160 ML/day. 
 
5.1.2.1  Component reliability 
 
For the metropolitan Adelaide supply the South and Little Para subsystems join 
to supply the Barossa and Little Para region. The critical components in the 
transfer and distribution of the bulk water for the South and Little Para 
Subsystems have been identified and estimates of their components‟ reliability 
are presented in Table 13. 
 
Given the storage capacity of the Barossa Reservoir, it is possible to disregard 
the effect of a failure in the underground diversion and aqueduct, which connect 
the South Para Reservoir to the Barossa Reservoir. The underground diversion 
54 
 
and aqueduct operating in parallel almost assures that any failure within these 
components can be repaired before the supply within the Barossa Reservoir 
would be depleted. 
 
Table 13 Components in the South/Little Para Systems – Summary of values obtained in Chapter 4 
Component 









Warren Reservoir 1000 2500 0.99890 
South Para Reservoir 1000 2500 0.99890 
Barossa Reservoir 1000 2500 0.99890 
Trunk Main 1, based 
on length 90 (minutes) 0.21 0.99996 
Trunk Main 2, based 
on length 90 (minutes) 0.21 0.99996 
Distribution from data    0.99995 
Little Para Reservoir 1000 2500 0.99890 
 
The remaining components can be combined to produce a reliability figure for 
the Barossa/Little Para treatment area using a Monte Carlo simulation to 
generate synthetic failure data for the metropolitan Adelaide‟s bulk water 
system. These randomly generated failure events, represent the transition 
between states (working and failed) of all the components in the South/Little 
Para subsystem over a nominated number of steps. The results for the South Para 
and Little Para supply are presented in Table 14. 
Table 14 Availability of the Headworks 
 South Para Little Para Combined 









There are no interim states of operation for the supply. This is due to the equal 
capacity of both the Barossa and Little Para water treatment plants and the 
redundancy offered by the Little Para system. Therefore, the supply of water to 
the treatment area is either; working or failed.  
The design of the system with separate water treatment plants only requires the 
addition of the reticulation data to calculate the availability of the supply at the 
boundary of a property. With the data for Adelaide‟s reticulation not available, 
the average for Australian cities with over 100,000 connections was substituted. 
This produces the availability shown in Table 15. 
Table 15 Availability of the Water Supply in the Barossa - Little Para Treatment region 




Further discussion of the data is provided later in this chapter, however, at this 
point it is noted that there is some additional reliability provided by the simpler 
layout of the Little Para system and as would be expected, the parallel 
connection provides a higher reliability state than the single supply. 
Crawley (1995) did not provide a calculation for the reliability of the reservoir 
systems. In the report, it was assumed that the failure of these reservoirs was not 
significant and lay outside the work of optimising the water supply.  
5.1.3 Mannum-Adelaide Pipeline 
The Mannum-Adelaide pumping system was constructed as a means of 
supplying water from the Murray River to metropolitan Adelaide. Barrages were 
constructed in 1935 at the mouth of the Murray River to prevent seawater 
entering the mouth of the Murray River. Once completed, work began on the 60 
km of pipeline which connections the river township of Mannum to the terminal 
storage in the suburb of Modbury. The pipeline consists of three pumping 
stations used to elevate the water over the Mt Lofty Ranges and into Adelaide‟s 
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supply. A longitudinal schematic of the pipeline, storage, and pumping station is 
shown in Figure 11. 
The components of all three of these pumping stations are similar in nature, 
allowing the transfer of pumps and electrical components to other pumping 
stations in the case of a failure. The addition of an inlet and four vertical pumps 
to extracted the water from the Murray River, shown in Figure 9, are the only 
difference between pumping station 1 and the other two pumping stations, 
(pumping station 2 and 3), shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 9 Pumping Station 1 
 






















Power grid feed 
Electric supplier‟s main breaker 
Pump station‟s main breaker 
High voltage powerlines inside pumping station 
Switchboard 
Four primary pumps and motors in parallel 
Four secondary pumps and motors in parallel 
Four secondary pumps and motors in parallel 
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Figure 10 Pumping Stations 2 and 3 
 
 
Power grid feed 
Electric supplier‟s main breaker 
Pump station‟s main breaker 
High voltage powerlines inside pumping station 
Switchboard 
Four secondary pumps and motors in parallel 








Figure 11 Mannum Pipeline profile from Crawley (1995) 
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5.1.4  Millbrook Subsystem 
In addition to the Mannum-Adelaide pipeline, the Anstey Hill treatment zone is 
served by the Millbrook pipeline, which is located down-stream of the Millbrook 
Reservoir and aims to supplement the Mannum pipeline during peak demand.  
The operation of the Millbrook pumping station is similar to that of the Mannum 
pumping stations with the exception of the configuration of the pumps. Shown 
below in Figure 12, the pumping station is four sets of pumps connected in 
parallel, but only two of these set have a second set connected in series. The 
pumps connected in series provide 1.25 GL/month of water (type „A‟), while the 
single pumps provide 2.5 GL/month (type „B‟). 








5.1.3.1 Component Reliability 
 
The critical components of the headworks have been identified in chapter 4 and 
















Table 16 Components in the Adelaide Mannum Pumping System 































Grid Feed- Electricity 
  
0.99965 
Pump station Transformers 7 1 in 1600 0.999988022 
Pump Station’s  Main Circuit Breaker 7 1 in 500 0.999961669 
Power Supply’s Main  Circuit Breaker 7 1 in 500 0.999961669 
Internal High Voltage Cables 7 1 in 20 0.999041732 





















Pump Station’s  Transformers 7 1 in 1600 0.999988022 
Pump Station’s  Main Circuit Breaker 7 1 in 500 0.999961669 
Power Supply’s Main  Circuit Breaker 7 1 in 500 0.999961669 
Internal High Voltage Cables 7 1 in 20 0.999041732 















Grid Feed- Electricity 
  
0.99965 
Pump Station’s  Transformers 7 1 in 1600 0.999988022 
Pump Station’s  Main Circuit Breaker 7 1 in 500 0.999961669 
Power Supply’s Main  Circuit Breaker 7 1 in 500 0.999961669 
Internal High Voltage Cables 7 1 in 20 0.999041732 











Table 17 Components in the Millbrook Pumping System 

























Transformers 7 1 in 1600 0.999988022 
Pumping Station‟s Main 
Circuit Breaker 7 1 in 500 0.999961669 
Power supply‟s Main  
Circuit Breaker 7 1 in 500 0.999961669 





Using the results obtained for the critical component‟s reliability, a Monte Carlo 
simulation was undertaken for the three pumping stations that make up the 
Mannum Pipeline and the single pumping station of the Millbrook supply. To 
produce the state transition tables shown in Table 18 and Table 21. These tables 
show the probability that the system will be in a particular state, which 
represents a discrete capacity, based on the number of pumps operating. 
5.1.5  Comparison 
The results of the Mannum-Adelaide Pipeline are shown in Table 18 
 
Table 18 Pumping System Capacity and Availability 






1 100% 10.4 0.93126 
2 86% 7.8 5.69 x 10
-2
 
3 57% 5.2 5.00 x 10
-4
 
4 29% 2.6 <10
-6
 






A frequency-duration approach and a Monte Carlo simulation were carried out 
on the same pipeline systems by Crawley (1995), although the approach and the 
system components were similar, different values were attributed to their 
reliability and some components were not consider by Crawley, such as drought. 
This produced the results presented in Table 19 and Table 20. 
 
Table 19 Frequency-duration analysis for Mannum Pipeline from Crawley (1995) 
State Rate of Entry Rate of 






1 0.201754 0 0.006900 0.923465 
2 0.159017 0.068966 0.001803 6.94471 x 10 
-2
 
3 0.214264 0.143845 0.002095 4.330009 x10 
-5
 
4 0.000381 0.214169 0.001906 7.65494 x 10
-8
 
5 0.007047 0.142780 0 7.04529 x 10
-3
 
    1.000000 
 
Table 20 Monte Carlo Simulation for Mannum Pipeline from Crawley (1995) 






1 672416 0.9230394 149.06141 
2 49816 0.068187 14.18047 
3 5 0.000007 1.66667 
4 0 0 0 
5 8337 0.011412 7.05927 
 730574 1.000000  
 
 
Similar data is also presented for the Millbrook pumping station in Table 21, 






Table 21 Millbrook Pipeline - Monte Carlo Simulation 





1 100% 7.5 0.98804 
2 83% 6.25 0.007946 
3 66.66% 5 0.003915 
4 50% 3.75 3.29023 x10
-5
 
5 33% 2.5 1.64512 x 10
-5
 
6 16.67% 1.25 0 







Table 22 Frequency-duration analysis for Millbrook Pipeline system from Crawley (1995) 
State Rate of Entry Rate of 






1 0.285043 0 0.001219 0.983557 
2 0.072540 0.071389 0.001027 0.529301 x 10
-2
 
3 0.216282 0.071341 0.000835 0.106074 x 10
-1
 
4 0.144130 0.142683 0.000642 0.570453 x 10
-4
 
5 0.071970 0.142779 00000450 0.286378 x 10
-4
 
6 0.000767 0.213976 0.000258 0.153701 x 10
-6
 
7 0.000590 0.144723 0 0.456970 x 10
-3
 









Table 23 Monte Carlo Simulation for Millbrook Pumping Station from Crawley (1995) 






1 719379 0.984004 823.08810 
2 3902 0.005337 13.73944 
3 7368 0.010078 13.54412 
4 60 0.000082 12 
5 4 0.000005 2 
6 0 0 0 
7 360 0.000492 6.79245 
 731073 1.000000  
 
 
The Millbrook pumping station provides an over capacity to the pipeline, which 
connects the pumps to the water treatment plant. This limits the capacity of water 
provided by the pumps to 6.25 GL/month instead of 7.5 GL/month.  
 
A comparison of the various pumping states for both the Millbrook and the 
Mannum pipeline shows that the values from Crawley (1995) and the values 
calculated here are similar.  
 
The slight variation in the failure properties between the values found in Crawley 
(1995) for the frequency-duration method and the Monte Carlo method are 
attributable to sampling and rounding errors within the models. Since the report 
was written by Crawley in 1995, computational power has increased markedly 
and it is now possible to increase the sample size of the Monte Carlo method and 
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The data is most relevant around the first pumping state, where all the 
components are working, as this represent the largest proportion of the total 
reliability. When compared, these values differ by 0.83% (0.0031) and 0.43% 
(7.7 x 10
-3
) from the frequency-duration approach preformed by Crawley. 
Clearly, there is very little difference between the values, and the probability of 
the system not providing water to Adelaide is very low. 
 
The major source of the variation between Crawley‟s results and the values in 
this report is due to the additional parameters for drought which is applied to the 
river intake, and variations in the reliability of the components selected.    
 
The above analysis stops at the pumping stations and does not cover the 
connection from the treatment plant to the point of use. This was due to 
Crawley‟s research focusing on the bulk transfer of water. To determine the 
reliability of the supply connection at the premises, the connections between the 
pumping stations and premises need to be considered. 
 
Of the components noted in chapter 4, only the pipeline line itself and the final 
storage tank would have an effect on the reliability of the system. The final 
storage forms part of the distribution and treatment system, which is connected 
after the pipelines join. The availability of components in Anstey Hill 
distribution and treatment appear in  
Table 26. 
 
Table 26 Anstey Hill Treatment Components 
Location 
Component 













 Distribution     0.999954 







The two pumping system operate in parallel (shown in Figure 8), up to the 
storage tank, and then the water is filtered through a single water treatment plant. 
With the addition of these components, plus the reticulations system, the 
reliability at the boundary of a property in Adelaide covered by the Anstey Hill 
water treatment plant is shown in Table 27. 
  
Table 27 Anstey Hill Availability 
 Availability of Water Supply  
Anstey Hill  99.86%   (0.9986)  
 
 
5.2 Hope Valley 
 
The Hope Valley reservoir is primarily used as a service reservoir from which 
water is distributed to the CBD and surround areas of Adelaide from the two 
larger reservoirs located on the Torrens subsystem. This distribution is conducted 
off-stream; water is piped into the Hope Valley reservoir from the other dams, 
with water from the local catchment prevented from entering the reservoir. 
 
These off-stream connections to the Millbrook and Kangaroo Creek Reservoirs 
and the connection from the Mannum pipeline, negate the effect that any single 
reservoir failure would have on the system. The Hope Valley reservoir is 
therefore treated in a similar method to the Little Para reservoir; as a single 
reservoir. 
 
Table 28 Hope Valley 
 Availability of Water Supply  




5.2.1  Summary of the Northern Adelaide Metropolitan Supply 
Based on the data obtained for the metropolitan water supply of Adelaide, there 
are three main supply cases: a multi reservoir system with a redundant reservoir 
supply, a pumping station system that draws water from both a reservoir and a 
river supply and a single reservoir system. The availability of water, the 
percentage of time that a property will have water, when provided with only a 
single town‟s main connection is approximately: 
 
Table 29 Summary of Results 
Location Availability 
Barossa/Little Para 99.99% 
Anstey Hill 99.86% 
Hope Valley 99.25% 
 
It is not surprising the Barossa/Little Para region has the lowest disruption to the 
supply. With a supply fed by gravity from two separate water sources, and 
treated by two separate treatment plant minimising the chance that any one 
failure can disrupt the system.  
 
The reliance of Anstey Hill on pumping stations increases the probability of 
disruptions to the water supply. This is despite the large number of redundant 
pumps and an alternative supply. The increase is largely due to the vulnerability 
of pipeline connections between the pumping stations, and the use of only a 
single treatment plant to filter the water. 
 
With only a single supply connected to the town mains, it is not surprising that 
the Hope Valley area has more disruptions than the other regions. The lack of 
any redundancies between the source and treatment exposes the Hope Valley 
region to prolonged outages, due to supply or storage failure. 
 
The intermediate results for the Millbrook pumping station, noted in section 
5.1.5, are similar. However, Crawley in his report did not consider failure of 
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reservoirs and only looked at the continuity of the water supply from these 
reservoirs. 
   
Similarly, the values obtained for the reliability Barossa/Little Para system are 
less than those used by Feeney and Thomas for the water supply reliability. 
Again, this difference is largely due to the inclusion of reservoir failures with 
this report.  
 
 
5.3 Selection of Town’s Main Scenarios for Further Analysis  
 
Most cities and towns throughout the world have water supply infrastructure 
consisting of the same basic components that are constructed into a complex 
network consisting of: water source, pumping stations, pipeline, reservoir, 
filtration, and storage. This section of the report aims to construct a generic 
model of these systems, which represents the water supply infrastructure present 
in most New Zealand cities.   
 
An examination of the water supply infrastructure throughout Australia and New 
Zealand leads to the formulation of four basic scenarios, which are common to 
the water supply systems. These scenarios represent an idealised model making 
it applicable as a generic solution. The four scenarios are: 
 
 Single reservoir (Figure 13) 
 Dual reservoirs, (Figure 14) 
 Pipeline pumping water from wells or rivers, (Figure 15)   
 Pipeline pumping water from wells or rivers in parallel with an elevated 




The entire city‟s water supply network tends to be much more complex than this. 
However, the supply to an area of the city is limited to the region covered by a 
water treatment plant.  
 
The inclusion of these single pumping case scenarios was to provide the worst 
real world supply condition. The real world scenarios favour the town‟s main 
supplied from multiple-reservoir systems. 
 
For the pumping system, an output of 50 % of greater is considered a working 
state. This selection is based on the review of average daily usage vs. the 
potential peak throughput of pumping systems. 
 
5.4 Sensitivity of the components 
The components values and assumptions within the model are subject to change 
and error. The potential impact these errors and assumptions have on the model 
are investigated through a sensitivity analysis. 
 
The sensitivity analysis within this report is conducted by varying a single major 
component away from the values found within the research and observing the 
change this has on the system reliability for each of components within the four 
town water scenarios. 
  
The rounding error present within the Monte-Carlo model leads to a larger range 
of variation being used than would be typical. The larger range allows for the 
trends within the model to be observed, whilst minimising the variation from the 
rounding error.  
5.4.1  Single Reservoir Scenario 
Figure 13 shows the schematic of the single pumped system. From the schematic 
it can be seen that four main variables will effect the reliability of a system 
constructed of a single reservoir: 
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 The supply reliability (reliability of there being water within the reservoir 
excluding structural failures), 
 Reservoir failure or a structural failure of the reservoir,  
 Pipe damage between the reservoir and the treatment plants,  
 Treatment plant and the distribution or reticulation reliability.  
 
The typical value for all five of these components resides around an availability 
of 0.9999, with the exception of the pipe failures, which varies with the length of 
pipe. 
 
The graph below shows the sensitivity of the system to individual variation of 
these five components 
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The following observations can be made about the single reservoirs system 
components in the sensitivity analysis:  
 It is the simplest scenario 
 Connected in series, variations in the reliability of the components 
produces a linear relationship for all the components.  
 All of the components have an equal significance in the single reservoir 
scenario. 
 
5.4.2  Dual Reservoir Scenario 
 
The dual reservoir system, shown is Figure 15, has the same main components as 
the single reservoir system. However, for the dual reservoir scenario all the 
components, with the exception of the reticulation system, have a redundant 
component connected in parallel. As noted in the single reservoir section the 
base values for these components from the research is approximately 0.9999. 
The exception is the pipe which is varied based on length, but for typically 
lengths of pipe this offers an additional order of magnitude of reliability 
(0.99999). 
 
When compared to the single reservoir graph the dual reservoir exhibit a greater 
level of reliability. This is expected, as the major components of the system have 
greater redundancy provided by the second reservoir.  
 
From the graph in Figure 16, it can be seen that a number of the lines will 
overlap when plotted. This is due to the similarity of their base values and 
method of connection. The exception to this is the reticulation which is 
connected to the merged system and exhibits a linear variation in the sensitivity 
plot.  
 







Figure 15 Schematic of Dual Reservoirs
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5.4.3  Single pumped pipeline 
The single pumped pipeline, shown in Figure 16, is a more complex system than 
that of the reservoir supplied water. This complexity is due to attempts to limit 
the effect that the pumps have on the system reliability by providing over 
capacity and redundant connections at the pumping stations. 
Typically, water is pumped up and out of the source to another pumping station, 
which pumps the water to tanks which then gravity feeds the reticulation system. 
This results in six main components being connected to a single pumped 
pipeline:  
 Supply reliability (reliability of there being water within the source),  
 Pump reliability,  
 Electrical components associated with the pumps,  
 Pipe failures (between pumps, treatment plant, source, and tank),  
 Water tank   
 Distribution or reticulation reliability. 
 
From Figure 18 it can be seen that variations in the pumps and motors reliability 
has the least variation on the system reliability. This is due to the redundancy of 
multiple pumps acting in parallel at each of the pumping stations. The rapid 
drop-off in the system reliability is due to variations in pumps reliability and is 
attributed to the pumps being connected in series for the water extraction and 
horizontal pumping. This combines with the parallel connections and 50% over 
capacity at each of the pumping station to give the line the curved shape.  
The pipe network causes a rapid drop-off in reliability. This is due to a single 
failure in the pipe causing a complete failure of the system and the multiple 
occurrences of single pipes between pumping stations, tanks, source, and 
reticulation. 
Water treatment, tank, distribution (reticulation) all remain linear as they are 
connected in series past the network of pumps and electrical components. 
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The electrical components consist of a number of elements connected in series. 
These components were grouped together to examine their effect, as a whole, on 
the system. If they were assessed individually, there would a similar linear 
relationship as the pipe failures. However, as a whole they cause the system‟s 
reliability to decrease in a rapid fashion due to multiple series connections, and 
have the most effect on the system reliability when varied. 













































5.4.4  Combined Pumping Station and Reservoir Scenario  
 
As this scenario is a combination of a single pumping system and a single 
reservoir system, combined at a point prior to the water treatment plant, the 
components of the systems are a mix of the two scenarios.  
 Supply reliability (reliability of there being water within the source),  
 Pump reliability,  
 Electrical components associated with the pumps,  
 Pipe failures (between pumps, treatment plant, source, and tank),  
 Water tank   
 Distribution or reticulation reliability. 
 Reservoir failure or a structural failure of the reservoir 
The interaction between the components of the pipeline and reservoir system is 
much more complex than any of the other scenarios.  
Figure 19 shows the schematic of the combined pumping and reservoir system. It 
can be seen that all the components connected before the system merges into the 
water treatment plant are connected in parallel. As expected they have a greater 
reliability than the single reservoir or pipeline scenarios. 
Those connected after the merger; i.e. water treatment plant, tanks, and 
reticulation, exhibit a linear variation. This linear variation is a result of their 
serial connections. This means that variations in the components reliability will 
have an equal effect of the system reliability. 
Electrical components have a sharp curve as noted above. There are a large 
number of serial connections between the electrical components and in this case, 
they are connected in parallel to the alternative supply. This parallel connection 
produces the curve in the line not exhibited in the single pipeline scenario.  
Due to the redundancy provided by the pumping system, an increase in the 
probability of failure of the reservoirs, pumps, and supply (drought) have little 





Figure 19 Schematic of Combined Pumping Station and Reservoir.
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5.5 Summary of the reliability of the town’s main. 
A summary of the availability of the four scenarios considered is provided in 
Table 30 Summary of scenarios. 
 
Table 30 Summary of scenarios 
Scenario Availability 
Single Reservoir 0.99862 
Dual Reservoir 0.99996 
Single Pipeline 0.99092 
Combined Pipeline and Reservoir 0.99468 
 
The reliability of water supplied by the dual reservoir is superior to the other 
supplies by significant margin. While, the single pipeline is the least reliable of 





















Chapter 6. Analysis of Secondary Water Supplies 
This chapter takes the values collected in Chapter 5 for the reliability of town‟s 
main and the values collected in Chapter 4 for the reliability of the individual 
components and combined them based on the four selected scenarios to produce 
results for the three classes of water supply shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22. 
The objective is to differentiate between the reliability of the different types of 
connections allowed under the New Zealand sprinkler standard.   
 
There have been some assumptions made about the nature a main‟s water supply 
system; these were provided to give an estimate of the range of supply available 
within a generic town. The occurrence of these supply favours the multi-dam and 
pipeline-dam systems over those of the single connections. These generic 
scenarios have also been made to avoid the need to specifically assess all the 
interconnections between wells, dams, and rivers – a simplification necessary to 
be able to derive general conclusions about the system reliabilities. 
 
The discussion so far has focused on the reliability of the water supply within the 
town‟s supply and the components that make up the secondary supplies. These 
can now be combined to determine the reliability of the different connection 
types discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Based on the result of these combinations, the probability of a water system 
designed to use a Class A or Class B2 supply from the New Zealand sprinkler 
standard has an availability within the range shown in Figure 21. This high range 
of availability is due to the high level of reliability in each of the components in 
the water supply system and the redundancy of the secondary water supplies. 
 
To illustrate just how reliably these supplies are: the annual probability of failure 
of a town‟s main supplied by dual reservoirs is in the order of 5 ¼ minutes per 
year (i.e. ~1x10
-5
). This probability can be approximated, as being between 
struck by lightning in one‟s lifetime is 1.6 x 10
-4
 (National Weather Service) and 
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Table 31 Reliability of Water Supplies 
 
Primary Secondary Class A Class B2 







Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.999996926 0.999996855 
Well w/ Electric Pump 0.999996370 0.999996291 
Open Water  w/ Diesel 
Pump 0.999997092 0.999997023 
Open Water w/ Electric 
Pump 0.999996536 0.999996460 
Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.999997610 0.999997549 
Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.999997054 0.999996985 
Elevated Tank 0.999999833 0.999999757 
 
      







Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.999999912 0.999999867 
Well w/ Electric Pump 0.999999995 0.999999843 
Open Water  w/ Diesel 
Pump 0.999999917 0.999999874 
Open Water w/ Electric 
Pump 0.999999901 0.999999850 
Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.999999932 0.999999896 
Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.999999916 0.999999872 
Elevated Tank 0.999999995 0.999999990 
 
      







Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.999979818 0.999979600 
Well w/ Electric Pump 0.999976171 0.999975945 
Open Water  w/ Diesel 
Pump 0.999980908 0.999980692 
Open Water w/ Electric 
Pump 0.999977261 0.999977037 
Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.999984310 0.999984101 
Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.999980661 0.999980445 
Elevated Tank 0.999998906 0.999998423 
 
      








Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.999998824 0.999998769 
Well w/ Electric Pump 0.999998611 0.999998549 
Open Water  w/ Diesel 
Pump 0.999998887 0.999998835 
Open Water w/ Electric 
Pump 0.999998675 0.999998615 
Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.999999085 0.999999041 
Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.999998873 0.999998820 





Table 31 Reliability of Water Supplies Continued. 
 
Primary Secondary Class A Class B2 






Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.999995107 0.999995022 
Well w/ Electric Pump 0.999994223 0.999994130 
Open Water  w/ Diesel 
Pump 0.999995371 0.999995289 
Open Water w/ Electric 
Pump 0.999994487 0.999994397 
Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.999996196 0.999996120 
Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.999995311 0.999995228 
 
      





Well w/ Electric Pump 0.999994535 0.999994444 
Open Water  w/ Diesel 
Pump 0.999995621 0.999995541 
Open Water w/ Electric 
Pump 0.999994785 0.999994697 
Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.999996402 0.999996328 
Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.999995565 0.999995484 
 
      




Well w/ Electric Pump 0.999995509 0.999995425 
Open Water w/ Electric 
Pump 0.999995714 0.999995633 
Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.999997043 0.999996977 
Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.999996355 0.999996281 
 








Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.999999735 0.999999615 
Well w/ Electric Pump 0.999999687 0.999999546 
Open Water  w/ Diesel 
Pump 0.999999749 0.999999636 
Open Water w/ Electric 
Pump 0.999999701 0.999999567 
Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.999999794 0.999999700 
Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.999999746 0.999999631 





It is clear that there is a difference between the reliabilities of Class A and B2 
supplies. This results from the exposure of the system to earthquakes. Although 
the difference appears to be small, if they were examined after an earthquake the 
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variation would be much larger. The values shown here only reflect the relatively 
rare occurrence of a major earthquake. The susceptibility of the pipe network 
during these earthquakes reduces the reliability of the Class B2 site main. If the 
earthquakes are ignored as a factor in the reliability, the availability of water 
supplied by a Class B2 supply would be marginally more reliably than that of the 
Class A supply due to the redundant pipe lines. 
 
The influence of earthquakes is also shown in the difference between the 
reliability of open water and well water. With the slight variation in reliability 
seen in all Classes, A, B2 (figure 17) and C (figure 18), the result of the 
earthquakes having a greater effect on the well sourced water. More discussion 
on the influence of earthquakes follows in section 6.1. 
 
From Figure 21, it is evident that elevated tanks offer a superior level of 
reliability when compared with those that require a pump to feed the water. Even 
when attached to the comparatively unreliable pipeline supplies. The 
effectiveness of gravity feeding the water is the main reason for this low 
probability of failure.  
 
When the pumps are compared, both electrical and diesel pumps offer very 
similar levels of reliability (availability of 0.998 for diesel vs. 0.9984 for 
electric). Variations in the maintenance, manufacture and design of the pumps 
could have a greater impact on its reliability, under normal conditions, than the 
type of motor driving the pump. However, during a fire the isolation from 
outside power sources, required for electric pumps, would mean that diesel 
pumps would offer a more predictable failure rate. This is illustrated by the 
requirement of the New Zealand Standard and many others for the use of diesel 
pumps as the primary source of pumped water.    
 
The reliability of these pumps is the dominate factor in the reliability of the Class 
C connections. This results in Class C connections having a much low reliability 
in general than those of either Class A or B. Class C2 supplies connected to a 
dual reservoir supply may result in a reliability that is close to those of a Class A 
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or B supplies when connected to a primary supply provided by a single pumped 
pipeline. The probability of failure of an open water supply boosted with diesel 
pump and connected primary supply provided by single pumped pipeline (Class 
B2 supply) is  2.41 x 10
-5
 compared to 5.57 x 10
-4
 for Class C2 supply. This is 
the result of the single pumped pipeline supply have a much lower reliability 
than the dual reservoir supply. However, connections to a single pipeline supply 




Even with the redundancy of the secondary supply removed, the supply of water 
from all the sources except the pumped pipeline still provides a very high level 
of availability. The probability range of the Class C1, a boosted single supply, is 























Water  w/ 
Diesel 
Pump





Class C1 0.997011 0.997011 0.989289 0.997846 0.996161 0.996280 0.996653 0.998216















Figure 22 Class C1 & C2 Supplies 
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As noted, the occurrence of pumped town‟s main in isolation is rare, however, it 
can be concluded that the reliability of these pumped sources would greatly 
benefit from the addition of gravity feed online storage, whether it is provided 
on-site or within the town‟s supply.  
 
The values calculated by Feeney (2001) for the reliability of sprinkler water 
supplies are shown in table 31.These figures were based on the previous New 
Zealand standard and do not include town‟s mains infrastructure outside the 
reticulation system. From the table, it is clear the reliability of the pumps 
dominate the single supply connections when a pump is connected. Overall, the 



























Table 32 Comparison with Feeney results 
 
Supply Probability of no 
water (Feeney) 
Estimate from this 
report for similar 
supplies (based on 
dual reservoirs) 
Single Town‟s Main No pump 8 x10
-5
 3.20 x 10
-5
 
Diesel pump 1.58 x 10
-3
 1.64 x 10
-3
 
Electric pump 2.08 x 10
-3
 ----- 









 3.35 x 10
-6
 










Town Main & Tank Town‟s main and 






Town main and tank 
with electric pump 
1.25x10
-7
 7.18 x 10
-8
 
Town‟s main with 
electric pump and 




 2.26 x 10-5 
Town‟s main  with 




 3.56 x 10
-6
 
Town‟s main with 




 4.32 x 10-6 
Town‟s main with 
electric and tank 










6.1 Discussion of Earthquakes 
 
The variation between Classes A and B2, supplied by the same source type, is 
limited to the effect that the earthquake has on the additional pipe work installed 
in the loop main of a Class B2 supply. This additional length of pipe leads to a 
relative small difference between the classes shown in figure 17. To further 
examine the effects that an earthquake has on the various classes and types of 
supply it is assumed that an earthquake will occur. This is done by setting the 
probability of an earthquake to 100% (P (earthquake) = 1) rather than using a 
return period (P(earthquake) =0.0021).  
 
In Table 33 it can be seen that there is a significant change in the probability of 
failure of the water source when compared to those discussed in Chapter 4. This 
of course is to be expected as discussion in Chapter 4 showed that the water 
supplies are vulnerable to damage from liquefaction, slumping, and permanent 
transformation of the ground. These factors are largely depended on the type of 
soil at site of the earthquake and the response that these supplies have to ground 
movement. 
 
Table 33 Probability of failure after an earthquake 
 
Source Probability of Failure 
Tanks 0.131344 
Pumping Station Failure 0.909275 
Well/Bore 0.761302 




The integrity of water tanks is likely to be high. The likely construction methods 
for water tanks, reinforced concrete and steel, have been shown to survive 
earthquake damage (Knoy 1996) when design for seismic forces. The analysis 
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leads to the lowest probability of failure (approximately 13% during 
earthquakes), this in part due to the design but is also the result of the amount of 
water that is stored. In the period following the earthquake sufficient water may 
remain in the tank to provide a reliable source of water. This is due to leaks 
slowly draining the tank. 
 
This is contrast by the rapid and high probability of failure of the pumping 
stations. This is attributable to the high frequency of failure during earthquakes 
of mains power supplies resulting in failure of the electric pumps. 
 
Unlike the pumping stations, underground water supplies need not be dependent 
on the electricity to ensure a continued supply. However, underground water 
sources are susceptible to failure from ground movements causing sanding or 
structural failure of the well/bore casing. The failure rate of water source from 
well or bores after an earthquake is approximately 76%. 
 
In Chapter 4 it was shown that surface water (lakes, dams, reservoirs) were one 
of the most reliability sources for a water supply. This was due to the water 
typically being gravity fed to consumers in surface water, however, the length of 
pipes require to transport the water from the source of origin to the customers 
acts against the reliability of the supply in an earthquake. This results in surface 
water having a much higher probability of failure at approximately 45% when 
compared to on-site tanks (~13%). Both of these sources in normal operation 
(without an earthquake) exhibited a much closer level of reliability. 
 
Once the adjusted source reliabilities are placed into the four scenarios from this 
report the reliability can be calculated for all the types of secondary water 
supply. The table in Appendix D shows the results of the post earthquake 
reliability of Classes A, B2 and C supplies under these conditions and Figure 23 





Figure 23 Post Earthquake Availability Class C1 & C2 
 
 
Figure 24 shows the relative influence of the local earthquake effects, the 
difference between a Class A and B2 supply, is much smaller than the effect that 
the choice of water supply source has on the availability of the supply. Further 
evidence of the importance of the selection of the supply can be seen in Figure 
23, which shows a large range of reliabilities (almost 0% through to almost 79%) 
for water supplies after an earthquake. It also shows that a secondary diesel 
pump becomes more important after an earthquake with up to a 4% difference in 
the availability. 
 
For a post earthquake scenario the results that Class A and B2 supplies are 
always more reliably than the Class C supplies no long holds. After an 































Class C1 0.5153473 0.7493723 0.0012093 0.4333128 0.2175094 0.4984215 0.6875651 0.4461729

















Post Earthquake Availability of Water Supply
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Chapter 7. Future Work 
There are a number of areas in which future work would yield beneficial results. 
 
 The costs of the equipment/infrastructure can be added to the model, this 
will allow for additional work into a cost-benefit analysis and the 
selection of the secondary water supply based on the reliability and the 
cost of installation. 
 
 There is additional scope for research into the quality of the water 
supplied, with an assessment of the pressure variations due to the 
outages. This would establish the vulnerability of the supply network to 
reduced pressures. This also has an application in areas where the water 
pressure is marginal. 
 
 The inputted data can be provided as distributions rather than a single 
value. This would allow for the inclusion of uncertainty in the results and 
would be beneficial in determining the level of error present in the final 
water supply figures. 
 
 Inclusion of data directly from the network models would allow for 
increased accuracy for the drought and headworks reliability. 
 
 Some of the data is collected in this report is for water supplies outside of 
New Zealand. It would be beneficial to change this data to specific failure 
rate taken from New Zealand equipment.  
 
 There is some scope for the inclusion of more advance earthquake 
modelling. This would better account for the regional effects that the soil 






Chapter 8. Conclusions   
In this report, a methodology for the calculation and assessment of the reliability 
of water supplies has been presented. This methodology consider four main 
scenarios for the supply of town water and a number of solution for locally water 
sourced from alternate supplies.  
 
In order to assess the reliability of these supplies, critical components within the 
supplies need to be indentified. The reliability and impact of these components is 
then determined and a calculation of the availability of the supplies made.  
 
The initial question that was asked in this report was “If the water supply is 
needed, what is the probability that water will be available to supply the 
sprinkler system?” It has been shown that in terms of the water supply conditions 
required by the New Zealand standard NZS 4541:2007 that the probability of 
failure ranges between 9.125 x 10
-3




From these reliability it is possible to draw that following conclusion about the 
classes of supply: 
 
 Class C2 supplies are always more reliability than a Class C1 of the same 
connection type.  
 Classes A and B2 are always more reliable than either of the Class C 
connections regardless of the connection type. 
 Class A supply will have a superior reliability when compared to a Class 
B2 of the same supply.  
 
Therefore, the hypothesis drawn from the New Zealand standards that the 
reliability of a Class A is greater than Class B2 and in turn that is greater than 
Class C1 and Class C2 holds true for most cases found in this report. 
 
The results for these supply have been shown to be similar to those found in 
Feeney when compared with the dual reservoir scenario. The reliability of the 
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pumping infrastructure has be also been found to be similar to reliability reported 
in Crawley. 
 
Earthquakes play and important factor in the selection of water supplies in New 
Zealand. The variability in the reliability of a water supply will be influenced by 
the effect these earthquakes have on the components. 
 
This is evident in both the on-site and town‟s main supplies with critical water 
supply functionality disrupted in all the cities investigated due to failures in the 
transmission and distribution pipelines. In the rare event of these earthquakes, it 
has been shown that the reduced pipe work required in a Class A supply has 
improved the ability of the water supply to continue functioning.  
 
Earthquakes also have a considerably effect on the transmission and distribution 
of electricity. This is coupled with damage caused by ground movement to 
considerably alter the reliability of water supplies in a post-earthquake 
environment. This results in tank supplied water being the standout for reliability 
during an earthquake. 
 
This research, as outlined in the scope, only applies to systems within New 
Zealand, and strictly speaking, the conclusions only apply to New Zealand water 
supplies. However, the similarity in the construction and maintenance of supply 
infrastructure and the requirements for secondary water supplies between New 
Zealand and many other countries could allow similar conclusion to be drawn. 
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Appendix A. Extract from New Zealand Sprinkler 




























P a r t 6 
WATER SUPPLY 
601 GENERAL 
To ensure its reliability, every sprinkler system shall have a reliable primary 
water supply complying with this section. An additional or secondary water 
supply is required by this Standard where the building presents a greater risk to 
occupants or contents and is larger or higher, thus being more difficult for the 
Fire Service to control a fire (see 602.5). 
 
A secondary water supply shall not be required for a sprinkler system to comply 
with the Compliance Documents of the New Zealand Building Code. 
 
602 CLASSES OF WATER SUPPLY 
602.1 Classification 
The water supply of a sprinkler system shall be classified according to its 
reliability and number of supplies as follows: 
 
Class A – Dual superior supply 
Two approved supplies, both of which shall be carried independently to a 
combined main within each control valve enclosure, at least one of which shall 
be a primary supply, but only one of which may be dependent on a town’s main. 
  
Class B2 – Private site fire main 
A private reticulation system which complies with 612 and is reserved solely for 
fire purposes, being charged with water and normally pressurised, comprising of 
at least one approved ring and supplied by two approved supplies, at least one of 
which shall be a primary supply, but only one of which may be dependent on a 
town’s main. The sprinkler system(s) water supply connection pipes shall be 
independently connected to the fire main. Two connections shall be carried 
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independently to a combined main within each valve enclosure. Isolation valves 
shall be provided at each connection with the fire main so as to ensure that there 
are at least two isolation valves between any two connections. 
 
Class C2 – Single superior supply 
A single approved primary supply. Where the supply is reliant on the use of fire 
pumps, two pumps shall be provided in parallel. Each pump shall be individually 
capable of meeting the highest design flow and pressure. At least one pump shall 
be driven by a diesel engine. 
 
Class C1– Single supply 
One approved primary supply. 
NOTE – See figure 6.1. 
 
602.2 Primary supply 
A primary supply shall be only one of the following: 
(a) A town‟s main, boosted town‟s main, or supplemented town‟s main provided 
that any pump is driven by a diesel engine; 
(b) A diesel engine driven pump taking water from an approved source other 
than a town‟s main; 
(c) An elevated tank. 
 
602.3 Secondary supply 
A secondary supply shall be one of the following: 
(a) A town’s main, boosted town’s main, or supplemented town’s main where any 
pump is either diesel engine or electric motor driven; 
(b) A diesel engine or electric motor driven pump taking water from an approved 
source other than a town’s main; 





Every water supply shall: 
(a) Automatically provide water at least at the design flows and pressures 
specified in 603; 
(b) In cases other than town’s mains, boosted town’s mains or supplemented 
town’s mains, have a storage capacity of at least that specified in 606; 
(c) Meet the requirements of 604, 605, 606, 607, 608 or 609 as they relate to the 
particular water supply (see figure 6.2); 
(d) Except in the case of town’s mains, be under the direct control of the owner 
of the protected building. Where this is not practical, approval may be given to a 
legally binding arrangement which suitably guarantees the right of use of the 
building owner to the water supply. 
 
NOTE – 
(1) The use of salt or brackish water is not normally allowed. In special 
circumstances where there is no suitable fresh water source available, 
consideration may be given to the use of salt or brackish water, provided the 
installation is normally charged with fresh water. 
(2) Attention is drawn to the need to comply with the requirements of the New 
Zealand Building Code Clause G12. 
 
 
602.5 Minimum water supply requirements 
602.5.1 Class A and B2 water supplies 
A Class A or Class B2 water supply as defined in 602.1 is required for the 
following buildings: 
a) Buildings greater than 25 m high, measured from the point of lowest 
entry to the floor level of the highest normally occupied floor, and 
located in areas having a hazard factor Z, greater than 0.13 (as defined in 




b) Buildings or groups of buildings used for crowd or sleeping occupancies, 
with a total floor area of more than 11,000 m2, unless the building is 
subdivided into sprinkler protected floor areas of 11,000 m2 or less by 
one of the following: 
(i) Walls having a FRR of 60/60/60 
(ii) External walls at least 10 m from the external walls of other 
buildings 
(iii) Combinations of (i) and (ii). 
 
 
602.5.2 Class C2 water supply 
A Class C2 water supply, as defined in 602.1 is the minimum required for 
buildings greater than 25 m high, measured from the point of the lowest entry to 
the floor level of the highest normally occupied floor, and located in areas 
having a hazard factor Z, equal to or less than 0.13 (as defined in NZS 1170.5). 
For further information, see Appendix H. 
602.5.3 Class C1 water supply 
A Class C1 water supply as defined in 602.1 is the minimum requirement for all 
buildings not described in 602.5.1 or 602.5.2. 
NOTE :A Class C1 water supply is the only supply required for a sprinkler 
system to comply with the Compliance Documents of the New Zealand Building 
Code. 
605.1 Acceptable sources 
The following are acceptable sources of water for pump units, provided they 
satisfy the detailed requirements set out in this Standard: 
a. Town’s mains (see 604); 
b. Tanks (see 606.1 and 606.3); 
c. Wells and artesian bores (see 606.4); 
d. Open water (see 606.5). 






































The Building Code of Australia still only reference the 1999 version of the 
Automatic fire sprinkler systems code. With a statement on the title page of the 
2006 edition reading: ‘This edition of AS 2118.1 is not referenced in the BCA. 
The 1999 edition, which this edition updates, continues to be referenced in the 
BCA. Both editions will achieve the same objective, however, this edition is 
predicated on advanced technology resulting in a more cost-effective sprinkler 
design and may be used as an alternative solution.’ 2118:1999 provides for 
grades of water supplies that need to be met for each of the hazard groups.  
Extract from the 2006 Australian Standards for Automatic fire sprinkler systems: 
4.2 DUAL WATER SUPPLIES 
4.2.1 General 
 
Dual water supplies shall be provided where 
a) a building is defined as ‘high-rise’, or 
b) required by building owners, insurers or fire engineers for High Hazard 
occupancies.  
 
and shall comprise any two of the following: 
i) Town main (see Clause 4.3.2). 
ii) Town main with automatic booster pumps (see Clause 4.3.2.2). 
iii) A private system water supply (see Clause 4.3.3). 
iv) A private system water supply with automatic booster pumps (see 
Clause 4.3.3.1). 
v) Suction tank with automatic pumps (see Clause 4.3.4). 
vi) Natural sources such as rivers, lakes or underground water supply, 
subject to the conditions set out in Clause 4.3.5, with automatic 
pumps. 
vii) Gravity tank (see Clause 4.3.6). 
viii) Elevated private reservoir (see Clause 4.3.7). 
ix) Pressure tank—permissible for Light and Ordinary Hazard 1 classes 




C4.2 Dual water supplies may be mandated by regulatory authorities for 
sprinkler systems serving high-rise buildings (buildings exceeding 25m effective 
height) where they are generally considered beyond the reach of fire brigade 
aerial appliances. 
However; dual water supplies are also frequently specified by insurers and fire 




4.2.2 Acceptable arrangements 
4.2.2.1 Independent arrangement 
Dual water supplies shall be independent, or form part of a gridded town main 
system, and shall have stop valves so arranged that in the event of a breakdown 
at least one supply remains operative. 
 
4.2.2.2 Individual connections 
Where dual water supplies consist of two individual connections from a town 
main system, each connection shall be carried separately to inside the building 
structure, as follows: 
 
a) Where booster pumps are installed, each connection from the town main 
system shall be carried separately to the pump suction manifold described 
in Clause 4.3.9.3. An isolating valve shall be installed upstream of the 
pump suction manifold on each connection from the town main system. 
Each of these two isolating valves shall be secured open and shall be 
positioned as close as practicable to the isolating valves provided, in 
accordance with the requirements of Clause 4.3.9.3 at each pump inlet 
(see Figure 4.2.2.2(A)). 
 
b) Where booster pumps are not installed, each connection from the town 
main system shall be carried separately to a point as close as practicable 
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to the sprinkler-protected building, where they may be interconnected. A 
single (combined main) connection may be carried from the 
interconnection point into the building (see Figure 4.2.2.2(B)). 
 
C4.2.2.2(b) The isolating valve on each of the two connections from the town 
main system, required upstream and in close proximity to the pump suction 
manifold, provide a means of closing off any damaged or non-operational town 




Where each supply requires a pump, one pump shall be compression ignition 






Where both supplies are comprised of tanks, with or without pumps, the tanks 
shall be either separate units or a single unit partitioned to hold the required 
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Table 34 Earthquake model survival rates 
Description Survival Rate 
Underground Water Sources  
Aquifer stops Producing 0.9 
Sanding of the well/bore 0.85 
Structural Failure 0.8 
Non-Structural failure 0.55 
Indirect Damage 0.99 
Well/Bore Casing Damage 0.99 
Slab and Casing Premanently Displaced  0.95 
Loss of Main‟s Power 0.05 
Loss of Backup Power 0.75 
Aquifer Contaminated 1 
Flooding to the Bore/Well Head 0.99 
Damage to the Bore/Well Head 0.99 
Transfer pipe from Well/Bore to Treatment Plant 0.9 
Pumping Failure  
Structural Failure 0.8 
Non- Structural Failure 0.25 
Indirect Damage 0.95 
Loss of Main‟s Power 0.05 
Loss of Backup Power 0.45 
Tanks  
Pipe Complete Failure  0.9625 
Tank Structural Damage 0.95 
Inlet/ Outlet Failure 0.95 
Pipe  
Isolating Pipe Failure 0.95 
Excessive Pipe Failure 0.15 




Surface Water  
Source Contamination 1 
Intake Blocked 0.85 
Structural Failure 0.99 
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123 
 







































Pipe Leaking  Non isolated-
Pipe Break  
124 
 
Figure 28 Fault Tree for Inadequate Water 
 
Pipe System Failure, and Tank(s) Drain expanded in previous fault trees. Source 
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Figure 32 Fault Tree for Source Water 
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Appendix D2 Availability if Earthquake occurs. 
Table 35 Availability of supplies after an earthquake 
 
Primary Secondary Class A Class B2 Class C1 Class C2 
      Town's Mains Single Reservoir Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.9996578689 0.9982455906 0.9960365753 0.9980286485 
  Well w/ Electric Pump 0.9996583023 0.9982477606 
 
  
  Open Water  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9997386362 0.9986500207 
 
  
  Open Water w/ Electric Pump 0.9997391019 0.9986523528 
 
  
  Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9999970701 0.9999440906 
 
  
  Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.9999976395 0.9999469414 
 
  
  Elevated Tank 0.9999999167 0.9999953108     
      Town's Mains Dual Reservoir Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.9999823499 0.9985740700 0.997383083 0.999377849 
  Well w/ Electric Pump 0.9999999957 0.9985758337 
 
  
  Open Water  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9999865166 0.9989027783 
 
  
  Open Water w/ Electric Pump 0.9999865406 0.9989046738 
 
  
  Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9999998489 0.9999545586 
 
  
  Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.9999998782 0.9999568756 
 
  





Primary Secondary Class A Class B2 Class C1 Class C2 
      Town's Mains Single Pipeline Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.9978311609 0.9963963733 0.9884562365 0.9904331490 
  Well w/ Electric Pump 0.9978339081 0.9964008306 
 
  
  Open Water  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9983431611 0.9972270888 
 
  
  Open Water w/ Electric Pump 0.9983461135 0.9972318790 
 
  
  Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9999814270 0.9998851600 
 
  
  Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.9999850360 0.9998910155 
 
  
  Elevated Tank 0.9999994721 0.9999903682     
      Town's Mains Pipeline and Reservoir Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.9998876496 0.9984782027 0.9917911770 0.9937747593 
  Well w/ Electric Pump 0.9998877919 0.9984800849 
 
  
  Open Water  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9999141723 0.9988290105 
 
  
  Open Water w/ Electric Pump 0.9999143252 0.9988310334 
 
  
  Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9999990379 0.9999515035 
 
  
  Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.9999992248 0.9999539763 
 
  




























Primary Secondary Class A Class B2 Class C1 Class C2 
      Well w/ Diesel Pump Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.9422238229 0.9401039503 0.7548190813 0.7563287195 
  Well w/ Electric Pump 0.9422970055 0.9401780347 
 
  
  Open Water  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9558631075 0.9539113121 
 
  
  Open Water w/ Electric Pump 0.9559417568 0.9539909305 
 
  
  Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9995052310 0.9980912381 
 
  
  Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.9996013721 0.9981885639     
      Open Water  w/ Diesel Pump Well w/ Electric Pump 0.9559190138 0.9539683184 0.8112031096 0.8128255158 
  Open Water  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9662825515 0.9645357722 
 
  
  Open Water w/ Electric Pump 0.9663426339 0.9645970368 
 
  
  Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9996220316 0.9985312499 
 
  
  Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.9996954766 0.9986061399     
      Tank  w/ Diesel Pump Well w/ Electric Pump 0.9995058577 0.9980935990 0.9916171694 0.9936004037 
  Open Water w/ Electric Pump 0.9996227052 0.9985337871 
 
  
  Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9999957630 0.9999391717 
 
  
  Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.9999965863 0.9999422733     
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Primary Secondary Class A Class B2 Class C1 Class C2 
      Elevated Tank Well w/ Diesel Pump 0.9999859364 0.9998399091 0.9987580786 0.9999959970 
  Well w/ Electric Pump 0.9999859542 0.9998401072 
 
  
  Open Water  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9999892564 0.9998768136 
 
  
  Open Water w/ Electric Pump 0.9999892755 0.9998770264 
 
  
  Tank  w/ Diesel Pump 0.9999998796 0.9999948982 
 
  
  Tank w/ Electric Pump 0.9999999030 0.9999951584 
 
  










































100 km of 















per year in 
minutes Reliability 
 East Gippsland  20 211.0 9.0                   838  121.5                   26  0.999951 
 GWMWater  30 226.5 54.0                1,245  81.3                   18  0.999965 
 Lower Murray Water  30 236.1 51.0                   873  76.5                   18  0.999966 
 North East Water  43 47.9 17.0                1,406  121.3                     6  0.999989 
 P&W - Darwin  47 119.9 41.5                1,258  56.6                     7  0.999987 
 Port Macquarie-Hastings  29 12.0 4.0                   753  180.0                     2  0.999996 
 Wannon Water  40 69.9 15.1                1,754  88.2                     6  0.999988 
 WC - Mandurah  36 82.1 5.9                   758  107.0                     9  0.999983 
 Western Water  46 165.6 22.6                1,645  101.6                   17  0.999968 
 Aqwest Bunbury  15 0.2 13.0                   339  30.0 0.0 1.000000 
 Busselton Water  10 78.0 10.9                   256  46.2 3.6 0.999993 
 Dubbo  16 26.3 5.0                   451  112.0 3.0 0.999994 
 P&W - Alice Springs  12 286.3 56.9                   378  117.7 33.8 0.999936 
 South Gippsland  17 251.7 93.0                   615  115.8 29.2 0.999944 
 WC - Albany  14 138.6 12.9                   434  97.0 13.5 0.999974 
 WC - Geraldton (W)  15 64.5 52.4                   505  56.0 3.6 0.999993 
 WC - Kal-Boulder (W)  14 62.3 21.1                   275  158.0 9.9 0.999981 
 Westernport Water  14 393.7 -                    368  78.1 30.9 0.999941 
